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AN OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DUE PROCESS
PART I*
0. JOHN ROGGEt
I.

INTRODUCTION

O VER THE PAST hundred years we have become administratively
managed with increasing frequency and regularity. More and
more we have been subjected to questioning by administrative and
executive officials, while our lives have become more and more guided
and controlled by the decisions of administrators.
More often than we realize, administrative or executive officials
can require us, by means of a subpoena, to come before them and
answer their inquiries as well as produce our records.' Administrative
officials or agencies grant, renew, deny, revoke, or suspend the licenses
that architects, auctioneers, barbers, hairdressers, manicurists, bartenders, chaffeurs, taxi and truck drivers, chiropractors, osteopaths,
physical therapists, check cashers, dentists, dental hygienists, doctors,
nurses, electricians, engineers, insurance agents, real estate brokers,
stock brokers, junk dealers, landscapers, lawyers, masseurs, masseuses,
money lenders, oculists, optometrists, peddlers, pharmacists, pilots,
plumbers, podiatrists, private investigators, psychologists, social
workers, surveyors, teachers, undertakers, veterinarians, weighmasters,
and well drillers need to carry on their professions, businesses, occupations, or other activities. One needs a permit to build or occupy a
house or other structure; to fish or to hunt; to operate a bingo parlor,
*This
is the first of a two-part article. The second part will appear in the next
issue of the Villanova Law Review.
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., University of Illinois, 1922; LL.B.,

Harvard University, 1925; S.J.D., 1931.
1. For a study of administrative inquiries, see Rogge, Inquisitions by Oficials:
A Study of Due Process Requirements in Administrative Investigations, (pts. 1-3),
47 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1963); 48 MINN. L. REv. 557, 1081 (1964).
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a bus line, a dance hall, a ferry, a hotel or restaurant, a race track, or
a theatre; or to run a beauty parlor, a bowling alley, a drugstore, a
saloon, a shooting gallery, or a skating rink. With the exception of an
unskilled laborer who is too old to drive an automobile, it is difficult
to think of a person who has not at some point been faced with the need
to obtain a license or a permit in order to function.
The grant, renewal, denial, revocation, or suspension of licenses
or permits is, however, but one part of administrative action. Administrative officials hire, dismiss, and suspend teachers and other public
employees. They take action with reference to students, regulate the
lives of members of our armed forces, and classify the young men
who register for the draft. Administrative officials act on the grant
or denial of passports and visas. The treatment of prisoners, juvenile
delinquents, and incompetents is in their hands. These officials determine who receives public housing, welfare assistance, social security
benefits, medicaid and unemployment compensation, and in what
amounts. They also allocate government subsidies and grants.
In addition to all these determinations which are made on a
more or less case-by-case basis, administrative officials and agencies
make rules which cover a multitude of situations. Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis has characterized this procedure of administrative rulemaking as "one of the greatest inventions of modern government."'
As the areas governed by administrative determinations increase,
so should the efforts of the courts to extend the concept of due
process - equal, even-handed, impartial justice under law, "fundamental fairness" to use the second Justice Harlan's phrase' - to
administrative proceedings. Our courts should harness discretionary
administrative powers, just as the courts of equity harnessed those
powers in an earlier day,4 and should protect the individual against
unfairness, arbitrariness, favoritism, and discriminatory enforcement.
Administrative officials and agencies, as well as the courts, should,
like Caesar's wife, be above suspicion.
§ 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
3. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan used the phrase in colloquy with the writer the first time the
writer argued Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
4. One of the objections to equitable relief was that it was as variable as the
"length of the chancellor's foot." John Selden (1584-1654), English jurist, antiquary,
and chosen patron of the Selden Society, complained:
Equity is A Rogish thing, for Law wee have a measure, knowwhat to trust
too: Equity is according to [the] Conscience of him [that] is Chancellor, and
as [it] is larger or narrower soe is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make
[the] Standard for [the] measure wee call A Foot, to be [the] Chancellor's Foot;
what an uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor ha's a long foot, another
a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; tis [the] same thing in [the] Chancellor's
2. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

Conscience.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN

43 (F. Pollock ed. 1890).
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The requirements of due process will vary with different situations.
If an individual's profession, livelihood, or liberty is at stake - if, for
instance, a lawyer or other professional person is in danger of losing
his license; or a public employee or tenured teacher is in danger of
losing his job; or a person on parole is in danger of losing his
liberty - due process will require charges, the right to counsel, a
hearing, confrontation with one's accusers, the examination and crossexamination of witnesses, and a reasoned determination. On the other
hand, if what is involved is a bar association's endorsement of a
particular judicial candidate, the punishment of a prisoner for an
infraction of prison regulations, termination of utility services, the
payment of unemployment compensation, or the amount of a government subsidy, a simple hearing by a disinterested individual open to
all parties may be sufficient.
II.

CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS

The concept of due process has been continuously evolving for
some eight centuries. One can date this development from 1178,
when Henry II appointed five judges for the whole kingdom and told
them "to do right judgment." 5 Sufficient legal development followed
so that a generation later, when Henry II's son John misused his
powers, the result was the Magna Charta and John was forced to
.promise his barons:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled,
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or [per legem
terrae] by the law of the land.'
In the course of time the concept "law of the land" also came to
mean due process of law. King John's successors confirmed and reissued the Magna Charta, sometimes repeatedly. In 1354, Edward III
(1327-1377), in addition to his frequent confirmations of the Magna
Charta, further provided:
[N]o Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put
out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in answer
[par due process de lei] by due Process of Law.'
5. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 482 (D. Douglas & G. Greenway gen. ed.
1953). In the years 1176-1178, Henry II instituted a permanent court of professional
judges. At first he divided the kingdom into six regions and appointed three judges
for each region, but this proved too cumbersome. He then appointed five judges for the
entire kingdom.

6. W.

McKECHNIE, MAGNA

CHARTA

375 (2d ed. 1914).

7. 28
3, c.University
3 (1354).Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
Published
by Edw.
Villanova
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Thus the phrase "due process of law" came into being.
Coke equated the two: "[B]y the law of the land (that is, to
speak it once for all) by the due course, and process of law."' In
this country, we have made the same identification. Our earlier state
constitutions usually used the phrase, "by the law of the land." 9 In
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,0 Daniel Webster identified the law of the land provision in the New Hampshire Constitution
with due process:
One prohibition is, "that no person shall be . . . deprived of his

life, liberty, or estate, but by judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land."
... Have the plaintiffs lost their franchises by "due course and
process of law ?" . . . By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law. . . . The meaning is, that every citizen

shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the general rules which govern society."
Similarly, the Supreme Court equated the due process clause with
the law of the land in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,' 2 its first major decision under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment:
The words, "due process of law," were undoubtedly intended
to convey the same meaning as the words, "by the law of the land,"
in Magna Charta. Lord Coke in his commentary on those words,
(2 Inst. 50,) says they mean due process of law. The constitutions which have been adopted by the several States before
the formation of the federal constitution, following the language
8. 2 INSTITUTES *46. See also 2 id. at *50. His reference in the latter place to
37 Edw. 3, c. 8 (1363) is to A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel, 37 Edw. 3,

c. 18 (1363).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1792) ("unless by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land") ; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (1818) ("but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art.
XXI (1776) ("by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land"); MASS.
CONST. Declaration of Rights art. XII (1780) ("but by the judgment of his peers, or
by the law of the land") ; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1821) ("unless by the law
of the land, or by the judgment of his peers") ; N.C. CONST. Declaration of Rights
§ XII (1776) ("but by the law of the land") ; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1790) ("unless
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"); PA. CONST. Declaration of
Rights § IX (1776) ("except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his peers") ;
S.C. CONST. art. 41 (1778) ("but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land") ; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1868) ("but by the judgment of his peers or the
law of the land") ; VT. CONST. ch. I, § 11 (1786) ("except by the laws of the land,
or the judgment of his peers") ; VA. CONST. Bill of Rights § 8 (1776) ("except by
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers").
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11. Id. at 561, 581 (argument for plaintiffs in error).
12. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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of the great charter more closely, generally contained the words,
"but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."' 3
In the recent past, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan have given
us apt statements of the due process concept. In Bartkus v. Illinois'"
Justice Frankfurter explained:
Decisions under the Due Process Clause require close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principals of our society. The
Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental
revelation but upon the conscience of society ascertained as best it
may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the
best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.1 5
In his concurring opinion in Griffin v. Illinois,"6 wherein the
Court concluded that indigent defendants in state criminal cases were
entitled to a free copy of the trial transcript where necessary to afford
them as adequate an appellate review as those defendants able to buy
transcripts, Justice Frankfurter stated:
"Due Process" is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful
social standards of a progressive society."
Justice Harlan thought due process to be fundamental fairness.'
It is this concept that courts must increasingly apply to administrative
proceedings.
13. Id. at 276. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), the Court, through
Justice Moody, explained:
There are certain general principles well settled, however, which narrow the
field of discussion and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the
authority of Coke, that the words "due process of law" are equivalent in meaning
to the words "law of the land," contained in ... Magna Charta .

Id. at 100. In a yet later case, Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926),
Court said:

the

What it [due process clause] does require is that state action, whether through
one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions
and not infrequently are designated as "law of the land."

Id. at 316-17.
14. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
15. Id. at 128.

16. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
17. Id. at 20-21 (concurring opinion). In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957), in a concurring opinion in which Justice Harlan joined, Justice Frankfurter added:
The implications of the United States Constitution for national elections
and "the concept of ordered liberty" implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as against the States . . . were not frozen as of 1789
or 1868, respectively. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the
changing circumstances of a progressive society for which it was designed yield
new and fuller import to its meaning.
Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
18. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also note 3 and accompanying text supra.
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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INVESTIGATIONS

In 1972 the attorney general of New York investigated the judging by the writer's clients of a contest that involved the number of words
of four or more letters that could be made from the letters in a certain
phrase.1" During the course of the investigation, while the writer was
present with one of his clients before two Assistant Attorneys General,
Carl Kleinfeld and Eugene O'Brien, this interchange took place:
MR. KLEINFELD: Mr. Rogge, may I interrupt you, sir.
This in an investigation by the Attorney General's Office. You
are representing Mr. [Donald] Jagoda here as counsel. Your
position in this office as counsel is limited to offering advice to
Mr. Jagoda as to whether he can or cannot answer a question
without incriminating himself. Other than that, your comments
cannot be made in the course of this investigation unless you,
yourself are sworn in as a witness.
MR. ROGGE:

Now, let me make an objection here. Behind

my back you have been in touch with my client. You have now
asked him on the record to write you a letter.
MR. KLEINFELD: Sir, you are representing your client in this

office. You do not represent him in a court matter. Mr. [Robert
E.] Perin [yet another Assistant Attorney General] made it clear
to you on an earlier date on the record that this was not a court

proceeding and you do not have the ordinary rights of an attorney
to be consulted separate and distinct from your client. We have
an investigation in progress here and our contact is with the
persons who are in the investigation. When you come into this
office with your client, you have the right to sit with him and

advise him whether a question put to you will or will not incriminate him and you have the right to tell him, therefore, not
to answer the question on that basis. That is the limit, sir, of
your...
MR. ROGGE: Let me advise you that my client is going to
engage in no correspondence with this office. If you want him

to come here and answer questions, fine. When you communicate
by writing to him hereafter, you will do that, if you please, through
me for I represent him.
MR. KLEINFELD: For the record, I will not do that because
the Attorney General is under no obligation to deal with an
attorney unless there is a court proceeding in process and at the
moment there is no court proceeding. There is an investigation.
19. The controversy reached the Supreme Court, New York County. People v.
Loew's Theatres, Inc., No. 41775/72 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed Sept. 13, 1972).
A consent order and final judgment was signed on July 11, 1973, and filed in the
Clerk's office on July 17, 1973.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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MR. ROGGE: For your information, my client is instructed
here and now to engage in no written communication with you
other than to produce the documents you request and to answer
the questions that you put to him.
MR. KLEINFELD:
Mr. Rogge, at any time that your client
wishes to give one of my letters to you and consult with you, he
has the perfect right to do so.
MR. ROGGE: I furthermore think it's a breach of ethics for
you to, behind my back, communicate with my client.
MR. O'BRIEN:
Mr. Rogge, you've made your objection.
It's on the record. Let's proceed.2"

The writer's associate, Richard H. Rosenberg, was shocked; the
writer was not. On the contrary, this seemed to be nearly, if not quite,
normal for administrative investigations. In fact, the writer has the
impression that when compared with the practices and procedures of
other administrative officials and agencies of New York and other
states, those of New York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz are
better than average.
Indeed, within the past two decades the Supreme Court, in two
5-4 decisions - In re Groban,2" involving the secret inquisitorial proceedings of an Ohio fire marshal, and Anonymous v. Baker,2 2 involving
investigations of unethical practices of attorneys by a justice of the
New York Supreme Court - sustained sentences of imprisonment
although counsel had been excluded from the proceedings. It is a
poignant commentary on our current inquisitional trend that neither
in England, where our accusatorial method had its early development,
nor in France, where the inquisitional technique took hold, is it considered proper for an official to question a person in secret and
without counsel.23
Inquisitions by officials occur on the federal as well as the state
level. On the federal level, however, the Administrative Procedure Act
affords certain protections. For example, section 6 (a) of that act
provides that:
A person compelled to appear in person before an agency
or representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented,
and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other
qualified representative.2
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Hearing of Feb. 8, 1972, at 17-20.
352 U.S. 330 (1957).
360 U.S. 287 (1959).
See Rogge, supra note 1, pt. 3, at 1085-88.
Administrative Procedure Act § 6a, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)

(1970).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,
1973
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There is nothing generally comparable to such protection on the
state level. For example, of all the states which provide for inquisitions by officials in the case of suspicious fires, only Georgia specifically
provides for the presence of counsel.2" Even when counsel is permitted
to accompany a witness, the attorney's role is usually very limited.
Neither the Model State Administrative Procedure Act, approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
at its annual meeting in 1946, nor the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, approved by the National Conference in the
summer of 1961 contains a provision specifying that witnesses in
investigative proceedings have the right to counsel.
In two recent cases, involving somewhat different circumstances,
the Supreme Court has gone in seemingly opposite directions on the
question of due process rights of a witness subpoenaed to appear before
an administrative or executive official. In Hannah v. Larche,26 the
Court held that the rules of the Federal Civil Rights Commission,
which denied the full right to counsel to a subpoenaed witness, did
not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1957,27 the Civil Rights Commission was required
to hold its investigative hearings either before itself or, on its own
authorization, before a "subcommittee of two or more members, at
28
least one of whom shall be of each major political party."1
In this
instance, the statute limited the role of counsel for subpoenaed witnesses
to that of "advising them concerning their constitutional rights."'
Moreover, the statute gave the chairman or acting chairman of an
investigative hearing the power to censure and exclude counsel for
"breaches of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics.""0 The
statute further provided that a witness could obtain a transcript of his
testimony at an executive session only when authorized by the
Commission. 3
The Civil Rights Commission, acting under this legislation,
subpoenaed several voting registrars and private citizens to a hearing
at Shreveport, Louisiana. The subpoenaed witnesses sought to enjoin
the Commission from holding its proposed hearing on the dual ground
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

§ 92A-729 (1958).
363 U.S. 420 (1960), rev'g 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).
Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 105(f), as amended § 1975d(f) (1970).
Pub. L. No.85-315, § 102(c), 71 Stat. 634 (1957), as amended 42 U.S.C.
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 1975a(c) (1970). Amendments in1964 provided a fuller right to counsel.

30. Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 102(d), 71 Stat. 634 (1957), as amended 42 U.S.C.

§ 1975a(d) (1970). The section was amended to delete the disciplinary provision
aimed at unruly counsel.

31. Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 102(i), 71 Stat. 635 (1957), as amended 42 U.S.C.

§ 1975a(i) (1970). The section was amended to permit the unrestricted sale of
transcripts of public sessions.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was unconstitutional and that the
Commission's Rules of Procedure were invalid because they did not
accord to those under investigation the rights of apprisal, confrontation,
and cross-examination. A three-judge court held the act constitutional
but the rules invalid ;32 the Supreme Court reversed, sustaining both the
act and the rules.83 In so doing, the Court approved the rules of the
Federal Trade Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission,
34
both of which contained restrictions on the right to counsel.
The Court erroneously compared administrative investigations to
grand jury investigations. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the
Court, stated that the comparison was made "to show that the rules
of this Commission are not alien to those which have historically
governed the procedure of investigations conducted by agencies in
the three major branches of our Government. ' 85 Justice Douglas, however, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Black concurred, pointed
out the difference between a grand jury and the Commission:
The grand jury brings suspects before neighbors, not strangers.
This Commission has no such guarantees of fairness. Its
members are not drawn from the neighborhood. The members
cannot be as independent as grand juries because they meet not
for one occasion only; they do a continuing job for the executive
and, if history is a guide, tend to acquire a vested interest in
that role.
The Civil Rights Commission can hold all the hearings it
desires; it can adduce testimony from as many people as it likes;
it can search the records and archives for such information it needs
to make an informed report to Congress. But when it summons
a person, accused under affidavit of having violated the federal
election law, to see if the charge is true, it acts in lieu either of
a grand jury or of a committing magistrate. The sifting of
criminal charges against people is for the grand jury or for judges
or magistrates and for them alone under our Constitution. In my
view no other accusatory body can be used that withholds the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination from those accused
of federal crimes. 86
During oral argument before the Court, Justice Black also emphasized the difference between a grand jury and the Commission: "Do
32. Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1959).
33. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
34. Id. at 446.

35. Id. at 449.

36. Id. at 498-99, 508 (citations omitted).
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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you think it [an investigation by the Commission] is the same as
the work of a grand jury made up of people living in the community?
They sift out the charges to be preferred."" When Deputy Attorney
General Lawrence E. Walsh pressed the grand jury analogy, Justice
Black responded: "Again I suggest a difference between investigation
by a grand jury composed of persons from the community and an
investigation by this Commission."38
Seemingly contrary to the result in Hannah, the Court in Jenkins
v. McKeithen 9 held that it was error to dismiss a complaint which
challenged the procedure of a Louisiana body called the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry as violating the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Marshall,
announcing the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, stated that the Louisiana
Act "was drafted with Hannah in mind and the structure and powers
of the Commission here are similar to those of the Civil Rights Commission."4 The Louisiana Act provided that a witness had the right
to the presence and advice of counsel, "subject to such reasonable
limitations as the commission may impose in order to prevent obstruction of or interference with the orderly conduct of the hearing." '41
Apparently the biggest difference between the two bodies was that the
findings of the Federal Civil Rights Commission were to be used for
legislative purposes, whereas the findings of the Labor-Management
Commission of Inquiry of Louisiana were for the purpose of exposing
violation of criminal laws by specific individuals. Despite the fact that
the Louisiana Act accorded certain rights to a witness, including the
right to counsel, Justice Marshall nevertheless stated in his opinion
37. 28 U.S.L.W. 3222 (1960).
38. Id. It should be noted that even in the case of grand juries, counsel for wit-

nesses have been asking for rights which have not been accorded them in the past.
Indeed, in the case of a grand jury witness at whom an accusing finger has been
pointed, counsel might argue for an extension of the right to counsel to the grand
jury room. Counsel can suggest that if in France an accused person has the right to
counsel whenever the juge d'instruction questions him, see Rogge, supra note 1, pt. 3,
at 1087-88, then by a parity of reasoning an accused person in this country before a
grand jury should have a like right. Yet, our courts have refused to go that far.
United States v. Rosen, 353 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908
(1966) ; United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 897 (1955); United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf.
United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965). However, four of the eleven
judges of the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc in Jones v. United States,
342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Senior Circuit Judge Edgerton, Chief Judge Bazelon,
and Circuit Judges Fahy and Wright) would have ordered the dismissal of an indictment based on an accused's answers to questions, given without the benefit of counsel,
before the grand jury which returned it.
39. 395 U.S. 411 (1969), rev'g 286 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1968).
40. Id. at 425.
41. Act 2 of 1967, 1st Ex. Sess., §§ 1-18 (repealed 1972).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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"that due process requires the Commission to afford a person being
investigated the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, subject only to traditional limitations on those rights."42
Subsequently, the Third Circuit considered the interrelationship
of Hannah and Jenkins in United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias" when
ruling on the constitutionality of the statute creating the New Jersey
State Commission of Investigation. The witness contended that the
statute, both on its face and as applied, violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment for failure to provide minimal due process
safeguards for those appearing before the Commission. The Third
Circuit considered the question in terms of whether the New Jersey
statute created a body which was investigatory and thus within Hannah,
or adjudicatory or accusatory and thus within Jenkins."
Section 11 of the New Jersey Act provided:
By such means and to such extent as it shall deem appropriate,
the commission shall keep the public informed as to the operations
of organized crime, problems of criminal law enforcement in the
State and other activities of the commission.45
42. 395 U.S. at 429. Justices Douglas and Black concurred in the result for the
reasons stated in the former's dissenting opinion in Hannah.
In an earlier case, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951), the Court indicated that President Truman's Loyalty Order, Exec.
Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1957), did not, without more, authorize the attorney
general to submit a designated list of subversive organizations to the Loyalty
Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. Though there was no opinion for
the Court, Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion wrote:
Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights
have heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness.
Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional
system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to past instances.
341 U.S. at 173-74.
Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion added:
It is not enough to know that the men applying the standard are honorable
and devoted men. This is a government of laws, not of inen ...
Notice and opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due process of law.
Id. at 177-78.
43. 465 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1972). Earlier in the same case the Third Circuit had
held that the use immunity provision in the New Jersey Act violated the fifth amendment provision against self-incrimination. 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971). However, the
Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion in Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigating
Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), and reversed the Third Circuit's judgment. 406 U.S. 952
(1972). It was on remand that the Third Circuit considered the due process claims.
44. After reviewing Hannah and Jenkins, the court stated:
The thrust of these decisions is that the requirements of due process vary with
the type of proceeding involved. Fewer procedural safeguards are required by the
due process clause in hearings before purely investigative agencies or agencies conducting purely investigative hearings. But when an agency is adjudicatory or
accusatory in the sense that it is used to find named individuals guilty of crimes or
to make similar determinations finally and directly affecting substantial personal
interests, the due process clause requires the full panoply of procedural safeguards traditionally required in adjudicatory proceedings.
465 F.2d at 768 (footnote omitted).
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9M-11 (1970).
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Witnesses summoned to testify before the Commission had the right
to be accompanied by counsel, who was to be permitted to advise the
witness of his rights. However, that right to advise was "subject to
reasonable limitations to prevent obstruction of or interference with
the orderly conduct of the hearing."4 At public hearings, counsel for
a witness could submit proposed questions to be asked of the witness
relevant to the matters upon which the witness had been questioned,
but the Commission was only required to ask the witness "such of the
questions as it may [have] deem[ed] appropriate to its inquiry."''
A witness had no right to either cross-examine other witnesses or
to call witnesses, although he could file a sworn statement relative to
his testimony for incorporation into the record at the conclusion of
48
his examination.
Section 11 would thus appear to make the New Jersey Commission
accusatorial and, thus, invalid under Jenkins. However, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in In re Zicarelli,49 had held that the Commission
was an investigatory body with no power to make and publicize
findings with respect to the guilt of specific individuals. The Third
Circuit considered itself bound by the New Jersey Court's construction
of the statute and sustained, under Hannah, the procedures of the
Commission:
Since the Commission has a purely investigative character and
purpose, the due process clause does not require the full panoply
of judicial procedures in hearings before the Commission. We
conclude that the procedures of the Commission, which so closely
parallel the procedures of the Civil Rights Commission upheld in
Hannah, comport with the requirements of due process.5"
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Crime Control Act) 5
extended the right of inquisitorial investigation to the Attorney
General of the United States and to a body called a "special grand
jury" - a body which is more like the Louisiana Labor-Management
46. Id. § 52:13E-3.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 52:13E-5.
49. 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Zicarelli v. New Jersey
Invest. Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
50. Id. at 769-70. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
State Commission of Investigation could force witnesses to testify at public hearings.
Cali v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Invest., 63 N.J. 310, 307 A.2d 90 (1973).
In In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court of Queen's
Bench, ___ F. Supp. __ (N.D. Cal. 1973), the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1782
(1970), did not authorize federal district courts to compel testimony for use by a
Canadian commission of inquiry conducting an investigation unrelated to a judicial or
quasi-judicial inquiry. Id. at ------51. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of
18, 28 U.S.C.).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1

12

Rogge: An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part I
NOVEMBER

1973]

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Commission of Inquiry whose procedure the Court invalidated in
Jenkins than a grand jury. The grant of inquisitorial powers to the
Attorney General is contained in the additions of sections 1961 through
1968 to title 18 of the United States Code. Section 1968, headed "Civil
investigative demand," provides, in part:
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
any person or enterprise may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary materials relevant to a racketeering investigation, he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal
proceeding thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon
such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person
to produce such material for examination.5"
The dissenters on the House Judiciary Committee objected to such a
broad grant of power to the Attorney General. In their view the
section gave the Attorney General "carte blanche to engage in fishing
expeditions, unfettered even by the controls of a grand jury's proceeding.' '1 3 It is suggested that counsel opposing the Attorney General's
civil investigative demands under section 1968 could begin their attack
by utilizing a recent state case, Robert v. Whitaker,54 wherein the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the quashing of a subpoena of
Minnesota's public examiner on the ground that the breadth of the
subpoena violated the subpoenaed individual's right to privacy.
The "special grand jury" was provided through the addition of
section 3331 through 3334 to title 18. The special grand jury was
empowered to submit a report to the court:
(1) concerning noncriminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance in office involving organized criminal activity by an
appointed public officer or employee as the basis for a recommendation or removal or disciplinary action; or
(2) regarding organized crime conditions in the district. 55
The dissenters on the House Judiciary Committee pointed out
the difference between the special grand jury and an ordinary grand
jury." In doing so, they relied upon Wood v. Hughes,"7 a case in
which the New York Court of Appeals held that a grand jury which
uncovered no evidence warranting an indictment could not present to
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1968(a) (1970).

53. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 188-89 (1970) (dissenting views).
54. 287 Minn. 452, 178 N.W.2d 869 (1970).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (1970).
56. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, supra note 53, at 182-83 (dissenting views).
57. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 173 N.E.2d 21, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961), Accord, Hammond
v. Brown,
323 F.University
Supp. 326
(N.D.
Ohio),
F.2d
480 (6th
Published
by Villanova
Charles
Widger
Schoolaff'd,
of Law450
Digital
Repository,
1973Cir. 1971).
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the court for filing as a public record a report which censured and
castigated public officials for their conduct in office. The dissenting
congressmen quoted from the opinion:
In the public mind, accusation by report is indistinguishable
from accusation by indictment and subjects those against whom
it is directed to the same public condemnation and opprobrium
as if they had been indicted.5"
They concluded that the special grand jury device deprived "both the
innocent and the 'guilty' of basic rights of due process," and that there
was no need to "corrupt civil liberties in order to combat corruption
in public office."" 9 It is suggested that counsel consider the points made
by the dissenting congressmen and begin any attacks on the special
grand juries authorized under the Crime Control Act by arguing
Jenkins.
The writer made a study of administrative inquiries and concluded
that a witness subpoenaed to appear before an administrative or executive official should be accorded certain rights as a matter of due process.
Assistance of counsel should not be limited to ear-whispering. The
witness should be apprised of the nature of the inquiry as well as the
subject matter about which he is to be questioned. He should be
provided with a copy of his testimony and of any documentary material
he supplies, and he should be afforded immunity from prosecution
unless, with full understanding, he waives his privilege against selfincrimination."0 It is this writer's opinion that In re Groban" and
Anonymous v. Baker62 should be overruled on due process grounds as
unceremoniously as was Betts v. Brady. 3
In suggesting these due process rights, the writer has no thought
of curbing or reversing the current inquisitional trend. If the way of
the future is inquisition by officials, so be it. Nor is there in this
suggestion any demand for confrontation and cross-examination in all
situations. Administrative investigations should be sweeping if necessary, and should be allowed to proceed in a truly unhampered, expeditious, and effective manner. However, the rights of individuals subpoenaed to appear before executive or administrative investigators
should be protected by the due process clauses, a protection comparable
58. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, supra note 53, at
9 N.Y.2d at 154, 173 N.E.2d at 26, 212 N.Y.S.2d at
59. H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 53, at 184
60. See Rogge, supra note 1.
61. 352 U.S. 330 (1957). See notes 21-23 and
62. 360 U.S. 287 (1959). See notes 22-23 and
63.

316 U.S. 455 (1942).

183 (dissenting views), quoting
39.
(dissenting views).
accompanying text supra.
accompanying text supra.

Betts v. Brady was overruled in Gideon v. Wain-

wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (defendants in criminal cases guaranteed assistance
of counsel as a fundamental right essential to a fair trial).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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to that which existed when grand juries were the accusers and our
officials did not have inquisitional powers.
IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

A.

64

Licenses and Permits

Nothing is more ubiquitous in the lives of many of us than the
need for a license or a permit. Court cases extending due process
concepts to administrative proceedings involving the grant, renewal,
denial, revocation, or suspension of such documents are becoming legion.
In Willner v. Committee on Character& Fitness,5 an unsuccessful applicant for admission to the bar alleged that the Committee on
Character and Fitness never afforded him an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine those who had spoken ill of him to members of
the Committee. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas,
held that he was denied due process:
We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due
process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of
those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood. . . . That
view has been taken by several state courts when it comes to
procedural due process and the admission to practice law ...
We think the need for confrontation is a necessary conclusion
from the requirements of procedural due process in a situation
such as this."0
In re Ruffao 67 involved suspension from the Ohio bar. Ruffalo,
active in the trial of Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
cases, had hired a railroad man, a night-shift car inspector, to investigate the cases. The Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline charged Ruffalo with using his investigator to solicit
clients. After hearing the testimony, a new charge, hiring the railroad
64. In the following sections agency action and the courts' reaction will be
examined in 31 areas. While the treatment is not exhaustive, it is hoped that it will
give the reader an appreciation of the grounds upon which specific agency determinations may be challenged.
65. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
The writer has included licenses to practice law, for such licenses depend
upon the action of admissions, character and fitness, or grievances committees whose
members, although lawyers, play the role of administrative officials.
66. Id. at 103-04 (citations omitted).
67. 390 U.S. 544 (1968). Accord, Nell v. United States, 450 F.2d 1090 (4th
Cir. 1971) ; Committee on Professional Ethics & Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169
(3rd Cir. 1971). In Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 424 F.2d 478 (6th Cir.
1970), the Sixth Circuit held that a complaint which alleged that the Kentucky State
Bar Association instituted a grievance procedure against Daniel T. Taylor, III, in bad
faith as an instrument for the suppression of first amendment activities, stated a good

claim for civil rights relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Taylor is a criminal lawyer who defends controversial clients, among whom are civil
rights activists.
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man to investigate the railroad man's own employer, was added. On
the basis of that charge and another, Ruffalo was disbarred. The
Supreme Court, again in an opinion by Justice Douglas, held that
Ruffalo was denied due process, stating:
How the charge would have been met had it been originally
included in those leveled against petitioner by the Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline no one knows.
This absence of fair notice as to the reach of the grievance
procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprived petitioner
of procedural due process. 8
There is a cognate line of cases involving denial of admission
to the bar because of an applicant's beliefs or affiliations. Justice Black,
in his opinion in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona6 commenting on a
number of those decisions, stated:
With sharp divisions in this Court, our docket and those of the
Courts of Appeals have been filled for years with litigation involving inquisitions about beliefs and associations and refusals
to let people practice law and hold public or even private jobs
solely because public authorities have been suspicious of their
ideas. 70
In Baird the petitioner listed for the Arizona Bar Committee all
the organizations with which she had been associated since she reached
16 years of age, but declined to state whether she had been a member
of the Communist Party or any organization "that advocate[d] overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.""' The
Court, in a 5-4 decision, found the question too broad. Although
there was no opinion for the Court, Justice Black, in an opinion
in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined, wrote that,
consistent with the first amendment, "a State may not inquire about
a man's views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding
a right or benefit because of what he believes." 2 Justice Stewart
concurred on the ground "that such inquiry must be confined to
knowing membership to satisfy the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

73

68. 390 U.S. at 551-52.
69. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
70. Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).

71. Id. at 4-5.
72. Id. at 7.
73. Id. at 9.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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On the same day, in In re Stolar,7 4 the Court reached a similar
result with reference to an application for admission to the Ohio bar.
Justice Black commented in his opinion:
The central question in [these cases] has been the same, whether
involving lawyers, doctors, marine workers, or State or Federal
Government employees, namely: to what extent does the First
or Fifth Amendment or other constitutional provision protect
persons against governmental intrusion and invasion into private
beliefs and views that have not ripened into any punishable
conduct? . . . [W]e hold that Stolar's refusals to answer certain

questions asked him by the Ohio Bar Committee were
protected by the First Amendment."
However, on the same date, in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, the Court sustained the system of
screening applicants for admission to the New York Bar. Under
New York law, the Appellate Divisions had to be satisfied that an
applicant for admission to the bar "possesse[d] the character and
general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law." 7 7
The appellants challenged the New York system "primarily on First
Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds." 8 The Court, in a
5-4 decision with Justices Black, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan
dissenting, held against them.
Two recent decisions," one by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit and the other by the Supreme Court of
74.
75.
76.
77.

401 U.S. 23 (1971).
Id. at 24-25.
401 U.S. 154 (1971).
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(1)(a) (McKinney 1968). Pursuant to N.Y.
CiV. PRAC. Rule 9401 (McKinney 1963) the appellate division in each of the four

judicial departments appoints a committee of not less than three practicing lawyers
from each judicial district within the department for the purpose of investigating
the character and fitness of every applicant. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Rule 9404 (McKinney
Supp. 1972) provides that "no person shall be admitted to practice without a certificate from the proper committee that it has carefully investigated the character
and fitness of the applicant and that, in such respects, he is entitled to admission."
78. 401 U.S. at 157. Reasonable certainty is a general due process requirement
for all legislation, whether federal or state, whether civil or criminal; for federal
legislation under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and for state legislation under the due process clause of the fourteenth. For example, in Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, stated:
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves judges and jurors free to
decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case.
Id. at 402-03. See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 844 (1970).
79. Sellars v. Committee on Admissions, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972), denying cert.
to .--A.2d __ (D.C. App. 1972); In re Schatz, 80 Wash. 2d 604, 497 P.2d 153
(1972). Contra, Rossiter v. Law Comm., --- F. Supp.
(D. Colo. 1973) (failure
of Colorado civil procedure rule to provide applicant with an opportunity to demonstrate that his school complies with American Bar Association standards deprives
applicant
of due process
of Charles
law). Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
Published
by Villanova
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the State of Washington, sanctioned rules that limited eligibility to
take bar examinations to graduates of law schools approved by the
American Bar Association. Justice Hale of the Washington Supreme
Court argued in a dissenting opinion that the Washington State Bar
Association had surrendered its delegated powers to accredit or disqualify law schools to the American Bar Association, a wholly private
organization."0
Other professional bodies have developed procedures in their
admissions and disciplinary rulings that are somewhat comparable
to those of bar associations. The case of Mack v. Florida State Board
of Dentistry"' furnishes a good illustration of the application of the
due process concept to an administrative hearing. After his license
to practice had been revoked by the Florida State Board of Dentistry,
Dr. Mack sought judicial review in the state courts where he urged,
without success, that the procedure before the Dental Board deprived
him of a fair and impartial trial.8 2 He did not, at that point, seek
Supreme Court review, but instead sought civil rights relief in the
federal district court.8 3 He argued that the proceedings before the
state board were unconstitutional in that the board acted as both
prosecutor and judge and, further, that the charges against him were
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court held in his
favor on the former, although not the latter ground. 4 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit rejected both of Dr. Mack's arguments, but nevertheless held in his favor on the ground that his administrative hearing
was not a hearing in the true sense of the word:
To get down to brass tacks, this was not
an ungoverned confrontation. We hold that
matter of fact, has not had a hearing in that
anything which claims to be an administrative
to the jurisprudence of this Country.

a hearing. It was
Dr. Mack, as a
sense required of
hearing as known

In so holding, we imply no affirmative criticism of the
Board members. They were not lawyers. Their mistake was in
not selecting some competent attorney as a presiding officer,
preferably acceptable to both sides, who could have kept the
hearing within due bounds while the Board Members heard the
evidence.
80. 80 Wash. 2d at 611, 497 P.2d at 157. In In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973),
the Court held that Connecticut's exclusion of resident aliens from the practice of law
violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
81. 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, 960 (1971), aff'g
in part, and vacating and remanding in part, 296 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
82. Mack v. Pepper, 192 So. 2d 66, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied,
201 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1967).
83. Relief was sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
84. 296 F. Supp. at 1263.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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We do not intimate that such a procedure is Constitutionally
required. We suggest it only as one way by which this situation
may be avoided a second time around. Neither do we insinuate
that administrative hearings must be conducted with all the
formalities and strictures of a criminal case. They do not. A
man who is about to lose a professional license which he has held
for twenty years, however, is entitled to develop his defense in
freedom from what took place in this case.85
Although both sides petitioned for certiorari, it was denied.86
In another illustrative case, Berryhill v. Gibson," the plaintiffs,
optometrists licensed to practice in Alabama, challenged the constitutionality and sought to restrain the enforcement of an Alabama statute
pursuant to which the Alabama Optometric Association sought suspension of their licenses. The plaintiffs worked for a firm that issued over
75,000 eyeglasses in one year, and those who were to judge the
question of suspension presumably would have shared in that business
if the plaintiffs' activities had been suspended. A three-judge district
court granted relief, stating:
The question of possible bias of the Board members in this
case is not whether the members are actually biased but whether,
in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible
temptation to an average man sitting as a judge to try the case
with bias for or against any issue presented to him. A basic
85. 420 F.2d at 846.
86. 401 U.S. 954, 960 (1971). In the case of the Florida State Board of Dentistry's petition, Justice White, in a dissent in which Chief Justice Burger joined, wrote:
Whether § 1983 is to serve as the analogue to habeas corpus in civil cases
displacing the usual rules of finality seems an important and timely issue having
serious state-federal implications. Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case.
401 U.S. at 961-62 (citations omitted).
87. 331 F. Supp. 122 (M.D. Ala. 1971), vacated and remanded, 411 U.S. 564
(1973). There were other cases involving professional licenses on the Court's 19721973 docket. Cooper v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 267 So. 2d 830 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973), 265 So. 2d 432, 267 So. 2d 831 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973) (dentist); In re Gross,
503 P.2d 995 (Mont. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (attorney) ; Moore v.
Boad of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. Adv. Op. 55, 495 P.2d 605, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972) (physician) ; Martinez v. Texas State Bd., 476 S.W.2d
400 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 4th Sup. Jud. Dist.), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (physician) ; Trimble v. Texas State
Bd. of Registration, 483 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 920 (1973).
In In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit held that
the failure to afford an attorney a hearing prior to the issuance of an order of
suspension based on a misdemeanor conviction violated due process.
The California Supreme Court, in Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners,
9 Cal. 3d 356, 508 P.2d 1131, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973), concluded that the defense
of entrapment had to be available in administrative proceedings at which revocation
or suspension of a license to practice a profession or business was at issue.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig, -La.
, .... So. 2d ____(1973), ruled that article 15, section 8 of the Louisiana State
Bar Association,
insofar
as itCharles
permitted
theSchool
summary
of an attorney
conPublished
by Villanova
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of Lawsuspension
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1973
victed of a "serious crime," violated due process.
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element of justice in America is that the court must avoid, not
only evil but, the appearance thereof. 8
The court quoted at length from the opinion of the Supreme Court
in In re Murchinson:s9
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial
of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man
can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest
cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships
must be considered. This Court has said, however, that "every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge ...not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true

between the State and the accused denies the latter due process
of law." 90
The Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the district court but
vacated its judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in
the light of two judgments of the Alabama Supreme Court favorable
to the plaintiffs' position."'
The most common licenses are those for the operation of motor
vehicles. Various provisions governing their suspension or revocation
have been established by the states. Bell v. Burson92 involved a Georgia
provision which provided that the motor vehicle registration and
driver's license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident was
to be suspended unless he posted security to cover the amount of
damages claimed by the aggrieved parties.9 3 The administrative hearing conducted prior to the suspension excluded consideration of the
motorist's fault. The Supreme Court, relying on Sniadach v. Family
88. 331 F. Supp. at 125.
89. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
90. 331 F. Supp. at 125-26, quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)

(citation omitted). The Court distinguished the Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), line of cases on the ground that "revocation of the license of a professional
man to practice his profession, together with the attendant publicity which would inevitably be associated therewith, would cause irreparable damage to the Plaintiffs."
Id. at 126.
91. Lee Optical Co. v. Board of Optometry, 288 Ala. 338, 261 So. 2d 17 (1972);
House of $8.50 Eyeglasses v. Board of Optometry, 288 Ala. 349, 261 So. 2d 27 (1972).
In State ex rel. Bowen v. Flowers,
W. Va ........
184 S.E.2d 611 (1971),
a pharmacist who qualified for participation in medical pharmaceutical programs
administered by the Department of Welfare of the State of West Virginia obtained a
writ of mandamus to compel the Commissioner of the Department of Welfare to
give him a hearing before suspending him from participation in the programs. The
court pointed out "that due process of law extends to the actions of administrative
officers as well as the judicial branch of the government." Id. at -, 184 S.E.2d at 614.
92. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605(a) (Supp. 1970).
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Finance Corp.94 and Goldberg v. Kelly95 invalidated the Georgia scheme.
The Court stated that, if a state issued licenses, those licenses could
not be revoked without that procedural due process required by the
fourteenth amendment. The flaw in the Georgia scheme was that
it did not provide "a forum for the determination of the question
whether there [was] a reasonable possibility of a judgment being
rendered against [the petitioner] as a result of the accident." 9 6
Bell has been applied in a number of cases.9" In one of these,
Pratt v. Kaye,98 the federal district court held that the fifth amendment
and the Administrative Procedure Act barred the director of the
District of Columbia Bureau of Motor Safety from terminating, for
medical reasons, the license of a driver of a private motor carrier
without first giving the driver an impartial and fair hearing. In
another case, Reese v. Kassab,99 a three-judge district court gave a
truck driver relief from a Pennsylvania statute that provided a system
of assessing "points" by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation upon receipt of notification of convictions of certain specified
violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. Under the Pennsylvania scheme,
a driver received notice of the imposition of the points on each occasion,
and, when a total of 11 points was accumulated, his operator's license
was to be suspended for a period of 60 days. No administrative
hearing was provided, either upon each assessment of points or before
suspension. The court held the Pennsylvania point system violative
of due process because of the lack of notice and opportunity for
hearing before the suspension became effective.' 00
Liquor licenses have also given rise to their share of court cases.
The leading case, and one which courts, including the Supreme Court,
have followed or cited with approval is Hornsby v. Allen.' ' Mrs.
Hornsby was an unsuccessful applicant for a license to operate a retail
liquor store in Atlanta, Georgia. She sought relief under the Civil
94. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

95. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
96. 402 U.S. at 542.
97. Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196 (D.S.D. 1973) ; Weaver v. O'Grady,
350 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ; McNamara v. Malloy, 337 F. Supp. 732 (D. Vt.
1971); Reese v. Kassab, 334 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1971) ; Pratt v. Kaye, ___ F.
Supp.
(D.D.C. 1971) ; Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal. 3d 792, 499 P.2d 979, 103 Cal. Rptr.
299 (1972), vacated and remanded sub nom. Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios,
410 U.S. 425 (1973). In Sandoval v. Hecker, 350 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1972),
and Christenson v. Campbell, 347 F. Supp. 82 (D. Ariz. 1972), the courts sustained
the provisions of the Colorado and Arizona statutes respectively.
98.
F. Supp. __ (D.D.C. 1971).
99. 344 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Pa. 1971), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Kassab v.
Trombetta, 42 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Aug. 11, 1973) (No. 73-286).
100. Id. at 747.
101. 326
F.2d 605University
(5th Cir.
1964).
The School
case was
cited
favorably
in 1973
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Rights Act,"°2 alleging that, although she met all the requirements
and qualifications, she was denied a license because of a system of
ward courtesy under which licenses were granted only upon the approval
of one or both of the aldermen of the ward in which the store was to be
located. The Fifth Circuit granted relief, reasoning that since licensing
procedures involve the determination of certain facts and the application
of legal criteria to them, basically a judicial process, the fundamental
requirements of due process must be met. The court stated that due
process in administrative proceedings of a judicial nature was generally considered to require conformity to the fair practices of AngloSaxon jurisprudence which it noted usually meant adequate notice
and a fair hearing." 3 In Mrs. Hornsby's case, the public interest
made the observation of those requirements even more imperative:
If one applicant for a license is preferred over another equally
qualified as a political favor or as the result of a clandestine arrangement, the disappointed applicant is injured, but the injury
to the public is much greater. The public has the right to expect
its officers to observe prescribed standards and to make adjudications on the basis of merit. The first step toward insuring that
these expectations are realized is to require adherence to the
standards of due process; absolute and uncontrolled discretion
04
invites abuse.1
Various other liquor regulation cases have recently been in the
courts. California v. LaRue15 involved a challenge to regulations of
the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control which prohibited nude sexual entertainment, either live or on films, in bars and
other establishments licensed to dispense liquor by the drink. While
a three-judge district court held the regulations invalid under the
first and fourteenth amendments, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the regulations were a valid exercise of the state's authority
to regulate the distribution and sale of liquor under the twenty-first
amendment. Addressing the regulations themselves, the Court stated:
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
103. 326 F.2d at 608.
104. Id. at 609-10. The court was also prepared to give injunctive relief if
necessary. Id. at 612.
Whether the federal courts could give civil rights relief where "property"
rights, as opposed to "personal" rights, were involved and whether they could do so
by way of injunction, were long open questions. Both questions have now been settled.
In Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), the Court concluded "that
the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights" as a delineation of the
Court's ability to grant civil rights relief was a false one. Id. at 552. In Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court took the further step and held that the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), was within the "expressly authorized" exception
of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
105. 409 U.S. 109 (1972), rev'g 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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A common element in the regulations struck down by the
District Court appears to be the Department's conclusion that
the sale of liquor by the drink and lewd or naked dancing and
entertainment should not take place simultaneously in bars and
cocktail lounges for which it has licensing responsibility. Based
on the evidence from the hearings which it cited to the District
Court, and mindful of the principle that in legislative rulemaking
the agency may reason from the particular to the general . . .
we do not think it can be said that the Department's conclusion
in this respect was an irrational one.'0 6
Other states have also tried to prevent nude entertainment in
bars. Wisconsin was one, but Wisconsin, instead of adopting general rules and regulations after hearings, provided only for legislative type hearings by municipalities on a case-by-case basis, "wherein
one is given notice of the hearing and a fair opportunity to state his
position."'10

7

The hearing did not necessarily include the right to

cross-examination or the requirement that testimony be given under
oath.' 0 8 A three-judge district court, in Misurelli v. City of Racine,1°9
a civil rights suit, struck down the Wisconsin provisions "insofar as
they permit[ted] renewal of liquor licenses to be denied [while] not
permitting the applicants an opportunity for an adversary type hearing in which the applicant is given timely notice of the reasons urged
for denial and an opportunity to present, confront and cross-examine
witnesses under oath with a verbatim transcript .

. . .""'

However,

in a companion case, City of Kenosha v. Bruno,"' the Supreme Court
held that municipalities were not subject to suit under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, vacated the judgments, remanded the cases, and directed
the district court, after addressing the issue of jurisdiction, to reconsider its judgment in the light of California v. LaRue,"2 Board of Regents v. Roth, 11 and Perry v. Sindermann,14 the latter two cases
both involving the due process rights of teachers in administrative
proceedings.
Atlanta Attractions v. Massell 5 involved an Atlanta, Georgia
ordinance which provided for the revocation of a liquor license for
106. Id. at 115-16 (citation omitted).
107. State ex rel. Ruffalo v. Common Council of City of Kenosha, 38 Wis. 2d 518,
524, 157 N.W.2d 568, 571 (1968).
108. Id. at 525, 157 N.W.2d at 571.
109. 346 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ; accord, Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff, 354
F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
110. 346 F. Supp. at 51.
111. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
112. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
113. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See notes 196-98 and accompanying text infra.
114. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See notes 194-95 and accompanying text infra.
115. 330 F. Supp. 865, reconsiderationdenied, 332 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
aff'd, 463
F.2d 449University
(5th Cir.
1972).Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
Published
by Villanova
Charles
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the violation of any law or ordinance, other than traffic ordinances.
When their license was revoked, one of the grounds being the presence
of prostitutes on the premises, the plaintiffs sought civil rights relief
in federal district court. The court held that the presence of prostitutes on the plaintiffs' premises did not violate any law or ordinance
and took the position that the ordinance which permitted the revocation
of a liquor license for the violation of any state law was overly broad
and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit affirmed but did
not reach the constitutional question."'
There have been many other licensing cases in a variety of areas.
A much publicized case arose out of the refusal of the New York
State Athletic Commission to renew the boxing license of Cassius M.
Clay (Muhammad Ali) because of his refusal to submit to induction
into the armed forces of the United States, and his later conviction
for that refusal. The Commission had previously granted, renewed,
or reinstated boxing licenses in numerous instances in which the ap116. 463 F.2d at 451.
The Supreme Court has recently faced a number of liquor license cases in
addition to those already noted. In B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d

607 (Me. 1972), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 410 U.S.

903 (1973), the Court was faced with a holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine that a Maine statute which forbade any Maine corporation dispensing food,
liquor, or other services from withholding membership or services to any person
on account of race, religion, or national origin, and on the basis of which the Elks
Lodge was refused a renewal license, was valid and did not violate the first amendment right of association. The Court, as noted, dismissed the appeal of the Elks Lodge
for want of a substantial federal question. But cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Other liquor licensing cases on the Court's 1972-1973 docket included:
Gianone v. California Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 412 U.S. 918 (1973), denying
cert. to (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 1972); Maita v. California Alcoholic Beverage Appeals
Bd., 410 U.S. 928 (1973), denying cert. to (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 7, 1972) ; Massell v.
Leathers, 229 Ga. 503, 192 S.E.2d 379 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) ;
Coleman v. California Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 409 U.S. 1075 (1972),
denying cert. to (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1972) ; Byrd v. District of Columbia Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd., 289 A.2d 877 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1075
(1972) ; Poff v. California Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 409 U.S. 1075 (1972),
denying cert. to (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 1972).
In Massell v. Leathers, supra, the Georgia Supreme Court sustained the
denial of a municipal beer license on the ground that the license was a privilege rather
than a right. Accord, Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Comm'n, 169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa
1969), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 400 U.S. 885 (1970).

However, the privilege-

right dichotomy became absolute with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6
(1969), and Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
In LaGreca Res., Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 33 App. Div. 2d 537, 304
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1969), the Appellate Division reversed the State Liquor
Authority's refusal to approve an application to permit a corporate change made by a
prospective purchaser of a restaurant. The refusal was based upon the prospective
purchaser's record which showed a conviction for disorderly conduct 16 years earlier,
an alcoholic beverage violation 9 years earlier, and a declaration of juvenile delinquency 23 years earlier. The Appellant Division stated that the Authority had to
exercise its duty to license consonant with the state policy to assist in the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes and the requirement that the good conduct of the
applicant be considered. But cf. Bergansky v. State Liquor Authority, 39 App. Div. 2d
849, 332 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1st Dep't 1972), rev'g per curiam 68 Misc. 2d 251, 326
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
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plicants had been convicted of one or more felonies, misdemeanors,
or military offenses involving moral turpitude. Muhammad Ali, through
his counsel, obtained injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York against the Commission
on the ground that the Commission's action violated the equal pro117
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Other recent cases have involved: licenses to operate a retail drug
store11 s and a roller skating rink;119 a license to be a private investigator ;120 a permit to construct a Federal Power Commission approved liquefied natural gas storage facility on company land which
was regulated by a development commission

;121

permits to build

houses within a city's boundaries when the federal government subsidizes part of the mortgage interest ;122 licenses to be refrigeration
and air-conditioning technicians;23 an automobile dealer's license;124
12
and licenses for film theatres.

Besides the myriad licenses in a multitude of fields that laws or
ordinances make necessary, there are the many permits that are required for holding a meeting, having a gathering, or conducting a
parade. The laws or ordinances which require such permits have
usually been invalidated either as violating the freedoms of the first
amendment, made applicable to the states by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, or as being vague and overbroad in
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment with respect
to federal action and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend117. Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Previously Ali had sought due process relief and had failed, but the court had granted
leave to replead an equal protection violation. 308 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
118. Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d
504 (1965).
119. Sunset Amusement Co. v. Los Angeles Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64,
496 P.2d 840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 1121 (1973).
120. Leggett v. Ohio Dep't of Commerce, __ Ohio App. _
appeal dismissed,
410 U.S. 920 (1973).
121. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973).
122. Morales v. Haines, 349 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
123. Arias v. Examining Bd. of Refrig. & Air Cond. Tech., 353 F. Supp. 857
(D.P.R. 1972).
124. Ford v. New Car Dealers Policy & Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. App. 3d 494, 106
Cal. Rptr. 340, cert. denied,
U.S
(1973).
In Katz v. California Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. App. 3d 679, 108
Cal. Rptr. 424 (Ct. App. 1973), the court sustained the denial of a personalized
license plate bearing the letters "E Z LAY."
125. Avon 42nd Street Corp. v. Myerson, 352 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. New York, 30 N.Y.2d 415, 285 N.E.2d 695,
334 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1972), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 57 (1973). In Avon, the district court
found that New York City's licensing ordinance failed to provide guidelines which were
sufficiently precise to meet the requirements of the first amendment. In Paramount,
the New
York Court
of Appeals
that
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Published
by Villanova
University
Charles held
Widger
School
of Law
Digitallicense
Repository,
protest under an unconstitutional licensing statute were not recoverable.

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 19: p. 1

ment as concerns state action. Three recent cases which, in turn,
cite many others provide sufficient examples. In Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham,'20 the Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth, a black minister, was convicted of violating a Birmingham, Alabama ordinance
which made it an offense to participate in any parade, procession, or
other public demonstration without first obtaining a permit from the
city commission. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that the ordinance, as written, was unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, stated:
This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within
the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30
years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow,
objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority,
is unconstitutional.
Even when the use of its public streets and sidewalks is
involved, therefore, a municipality may not empower its licensing
officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade, according to their
own opinions regarding the potential effect of the activity in
question on the "welfare," "decency," or "morals" of the community. 127"
Healy v. James1 21 involved the denial by the president of a statesupported college of the request of a group of students seeking to
form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
for official recognition as a campus organization. Such recognition
would have entitled them to use campus facilities for meetings, use of
the campus bulletin board, and would have given them access to the
school newspaper. The students sought relief in the federal district
court, which, assuming that the students had the burden of showing
entitlement to recognition by the college, held for the college. 129 The
court of appeals affirmed. However, the Supreme Court reversed,
placing the burden on the college to justify its decision. The Court
reasoned:
[O]nce petitioners had filed an application in conformity with
the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to justify its decision of rejection ....
It is to be remembered
126. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
127. Id. at 150-51, 153.
128. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
129. 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D. Conn. 1970).
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that the effect of the College's denial of recognition was a form
of prior restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range
of associational activities described above. While a college has
a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus,
which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden" rests on the
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action. 130
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach"'
was concerned with Hair, a rock musical in which there was mass,
full-front nudity of both young men and women. The manager of
the city's auditorium refused the promoter of Hair a license which
was required to use the auditorium. The Fifth Circuit ordered declaratory and equitable relief on the ground that the manager's refusal violated the plaintiff's rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments. A unanimous court stated:
This is a classic case involving the principle that our government is one of laws and not of men. The City of West Palm
Beach, Florida, acting through a duly authorized official, refused
a license to the promoter of the musical "Hair" to display the
production in a municipal auditorium on the basis that the musical does not constitute "family entertainment." Finding that subjective authoritarianism in the denial of First Amendment rights
is constitutionally intolerable, we conclude that the dictate of
the auditorium manager in this case cannot withstand the mildest
breeze emanating from the Constitution.
. . . In the instant case the defendant Boyes has permitted
the auditorium's public to hear or see only those expressions
which had the blessing of Eighteenth Century morals. However,
the unconventionalities of the Age of Aquarius cannot be constitutionally weighted by the bundling of our forefathers. Lest we
become vassals of men rather than souls of law, we conclude
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits this
auditorium man13 2
ager from being crowned a censor in chief.
130. 408 U.S. at 184 (citations omitted).
131. 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1972).

132. Id. at 1017, 1022.
Two other interesting cases deserve mention. In Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F.
Supp. 88 (D.R.I. 1972), the court declared unconstitutional the denial of access to
the Quonset Point Naval Air Station to Miss Linda Jenness, the Socialist Workers
Party candidate for President of the United States, and to Dr. Benjamin Spock, the
presidential candidate of The Peoples Party, both of whom sought to distribute
campaign leaflets and hold a meeting. Vice-President Agnew had appeared at the
station in his capacity as a candidate. The court stated:
Whatever the right of a base commander of a "closed" installation to deny access
to the base to all political speakers or candidates, once he has granted access to
one group
of political
speakers
candidates,
cannot
then
deny access
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Loyalty-Security Questions

While the courts have made their most solid progress in applying due process concepts to administrative proceedings in the licensing
cases, they have made the least in cases involving loyalty-security
questions. This is evidenced in such licensing cases as Law Students
1 33
Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadrnond, In re Anastaplo,'" and
5
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California."
The problem is pervasive. If loyalty-security questions are involved, an individual's rights and status may be determined in administrative proceedings on the basis of statements of secret informers,
without confrontation or cross-examination, and even, at times, without apprisal. This has occurred in loyalty and security investigations;
in hearings concerning federal and state employees; in investigations
directed at a multitude of employees in defense related private industry,
and at members or former members of our armed forces; in determinations involving aliens; in Selective Service hearings to determine
whether an individual is a conscientious objector; and in the State
Department's determinations with reference to the issuance or denial
of passports. In one instance the Military Sea Transportation Service
(MSTS), a branch of the Navy, ordered a marine engineer and two
seamen off an American President Lines ship for security reasons,
although all three seamen had Coast Guard clearance. The action
was taken without notice or charges, because, according to the-MSTS,
disclosure of the reasons for it would have endangered the security
of the United States. 3 " The government has also denied cash benefits due more than 250 former Korean War prisoners because of secret
Army charges of collaboration.' 37 Various cases arising in such types
of proceedings have reached the Supreme Court, but, as yet, the Court
has not spoken out against the practice of using secret informers.
On the contrary, the Court has sustained such practices in federal
plaintiffs, candidates of minority political parties who seek to exercise their
fundamental First Amendment rights.
Id. at 100.
1972), the court invaliIn James v. Nelson, 349 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ill.
dated, as a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments, a university regulation
conditioning door-to-door political canvassing in university residence halls on a
favorable two-thirds vote of the residents of each dormitory.
133. 401 U.S. 154 (1971). See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
134. 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (denial of admission to Illinois bar based upon failure
to answer questions not a denial of due process).
135. 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (denial of admission to California bar based upon failure
to answer questions not a denial of due process).
136. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1958, at 44, cols. 6-7.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
137. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1955, at 9, col. 1.
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loyalty investigations and hearings in both Bailey v. Richardson,3 '
and Washington v. McGrath,i" 9 although by evenly divided Courts.
In a third such case, that involving Dr. John P. Peters 140 of Yale
University, the Court avoided the issue. In United States v. Nugent 41
the Court sustained the practice of using secret informers in Selective
Service hearings, and in Jay v. Boyd 42 sustained the practice in hearings to suspend deportation proceedings.
Three cases decided in June 1959 involved the issue of confrontation: Vitarelli v. Seaton, 43 Greene v. McElroy,144 and Taylor v. McElroy.145 All three cases arose from security clearance procedures.
138. 341 U.S. 918 (1951), aff'g per curiam 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
139. 341 U.S. 923 (1951), aff'g per curiam 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
140. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
141. 346 U.S. 1 (1953), followed in Leifer v. United States, 260 F.2d 648 (6th
Cir. 1958). cprt. denied, 3q8 U.S. 946 (1959).
142. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
143. 359 U.S. 535 (1959), rev'g 253 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
144. 360 U.S. 474 (1959), rev'g 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958). In this case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that
the right to knowledge was not involved:
We are not dealing here with the vexed questions of the right of Congress, or
the press, or the public, to be informed of defense operations generally, or to
insnect particular documents. On this sub;ect, see Mitchell, Government Secrecy
in Theory and Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as an Autonomous Screen, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 199 (1958); Wolkinson. Demands of Congressional Committees
for Executive Papers, 10 Fed. Bar. J. 103. 223. 319 (1949) : Bishop. The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 Yale L.I. 477
(1957): 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 45 (1941). See also Hand, The Bill of Rights
17-18 (1958).
254 F.2d at 949, n.9.
The American Civil Liberties Union, in its brief before the Supreme Court,
while claiming for the petitioner the right to cross-examine all persons who gave

adverse information, nevertheless suggested as a minimum requirement, which would
have been dispositive of the case, confrontation at least as to the casual informant:
fT]he Industrial Personnel Security Program is in no way jeopardized when
the Government is required to separate the professional or "undercover" agent
from the casual informant having no legitimate reason for secrecy, affording
confrontation and cross-examination of the latter. See, Davis, The Requirement
of a Trial-Tvoe Hearing, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 193, at 212-14, 233-43 (1956):
Donovan & Jones, Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Commlnist
Penetration of Government Service, 58 Yale L.I. 1211, at pn. 1234-35 (1959).
Brief for Ameri-pn Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 14, Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474 (1959).
145. 360 U.S. 709 (1959). In this case the Court granted certiorari in advance
of the jndement of the Court of Anpeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. For
other employee cases where the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia denied confrontation, see Coleman v. Brucker, 156 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C.
1957). rev'd and remanded on othr oro.,nds. 2 7 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Dressler v. Wilson, 155 F. Supp. 373 (D.D.C. 1957). Both district court decisions
were by Judge Alexander Holtzoff. In Dressler, Judge Holtzoff declared: "To
be sure, he was not confronted with the witnesses against him, but as the Court has
just stated, there is no constitutional reonirement of confrontation with witnesses
outside of the criminal courts." Id. at 376. In Coleman, he asserted: "In other
words, procedural due process, in the opinion of this Court, obviously is inapplicable
to removals of employees from the Government service." 156 F. Supp. at 128. In
that case he not only ruled against confrontation but also held that letters of notification which simply advised employees that their continued employment "would not
be clearly consistent with the interests of national security" constituted findings
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Vitarelli was a federal employee, while Greene and Taylor were both
employees of private contractors with the Department of Defense.
In all three cases, the lower courts ruled against confrontation and
the Supreme Court reversed. However, in two of the cases, the Court
did not reach the issue of confrontation, and in the third it said that
it did not. In Vitarelli the Court rested its decision on the ground
that the Secretary of the Interior had not followed his own regulations; and in Taylor, on mootness. (The Defense Department had notified all interested parties that the petitioner had been granted clearance.) In Greene, the Court held the procedures of the Department of
Defense to be unauthorized. However, the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Warren, went further and stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends
on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's
case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important

where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose
memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or
persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice,
or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Court
has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has
spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types

of cases where administrative and regulatory action were under
scrutiny.140
During the course of the argument of Greene, Chief Justice Warren,
underscoring the importance of the right to confrontation in the situation, asked counsel, "If my neighbor accuses me of anything else but
this [that is, of being a bad security risk] that they are going to
put me in jail or deprive me of my livelihood, I have a right to con47
front him. Why is this different ?"1'

The language in Chief Justice Warren's opinion led Justice Clark
to feel that the Court had held that the due process clause of the
146. 360 U.S. at 496-97 (1959) (emphasis added).
Greene came before the Court a second time. The Court held, then, that
le was entitled to recover lost earnings estimated by him at $49,960.41 from
April 23, 1953, the date of his dismissal, to December 31, 1959. Greene v. United
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964).
147. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1959, at 26, col. 2.
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fifth amendment required confrontation and an opportunity for crossexamination in security hearings. In his dissent, Justice Clark noted
that the Court disclaimed deciding the constitutional question, yet
he was of the opinion that one reading the Court's opinion would
have little doubt that the broad sweep of its language indicated the
stance the Court would take in any future case. He expressed the
hope that the Court would change its position for he felt that failure
to do so would destroy the country's security system. 4 '
The winds did blow somewhat in Justice Clark's direction for a
time. Two years later, the Court in a 5-4 decision, upheld the security
risk dismissal, without notice and without a hearing, of an employee
of a restaurant concessionaire at the United States Naval Gun Factory
in the city of Washington.' 4 9 The Court analogized the employee's
dismissal to the termination of government employment which it noted
was, in the absence of legislation, a matter within the discretion of the
appointment officer. 5 ° Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas joined,
responded to the Court by pointing out what he characterized as an
internal contradiction in the opinion to which he said he could not
subscribe. He stated that while the Court held that the employee had
a right "not to have her identification badge taken away for an
'arbitrary' reason," it, at the same time, held that she had "no
right
to be told in detail what the reason [for that action was], or to defend
her own innocence, in order to show, perhaps, that the true reason for
deprivation was one forbidden by the Constitution."'
In support of the right of confrontation in other than criminal
cases, we have no less a protagonist than President Eisenhower himself. In an address to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League in
Washington, D.C., in which he described Wild Bill Hickok's code
in Abilene, Kansas, he said:
I was raised in a little town of which most of you have
never heard. But in the West it is a famous place. It is called
Abilene, Kansas. We had as our Marshal for a long time a
man named Wild Bill Hickok. If you don't know anything about
him, read your Westerns more. Now that town had a code,
and I was raised as a boy to prize that code.
It was: meet anyone face to face with whom you disagree.
You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage
to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry.
148. 360 U.S. at 524 (1959)

(Clark, J., dissenting).

149. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
150. Id. at 896.
151. Id. at 901

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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If you met him face to face and took the same risks he did, you
could get away with almost anything, as long as the bullet was
in the front.
And today, although none of you has the great fortune, I
think, of being from Abilene, Kansas, you live after all by the
same code, in your ideals and in the respect you give to certain
qualities. In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you,
he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow.
He cannot assassinate you or your character from behind, with52
out suffering the penalties an outraged citizenry will impose.1
President Eisenhower's words were not entirely lost, for both Justices Frankfurter and Douglas quoted from his speech in their disJustice Frankfurter said: "Presisenting opinions in Jay v. Boyd.'
dent Eisenhower has explained what is fundamental in any American
Code. A code devised by the Attorney General for determining human
rights cannot be less. .... 1154 Justice Douglas added: "The statement
that President Eisenhower made in 1953 on the American code of fair
play is more than interesting Americana. As my Brother FRANKFURTER says, it is Americana that is highly relevant to our present
problem."' 55
As yet, however, only one strong decision, Parker v. Lester,'
has favored confrontation in cases arising out of loyalty-security programs. In that case, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the Coast Guard's
security procedure because it failed to provide for confrontation. The
court based its decision on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.

157

152. Address by President Eisenhower, November 23, 1953, on receiving America's
Democratic Legacy Award at a dinner occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the
Anti-Defamation League. U.S. President Press Release (Nov. 23, 1953).

153. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
154. Id. at 372 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 374 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'g 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
See Brown & Fassett, Security Test for Maritime Workers: Due Process under
the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163 (1953).

157. 227 F.2d at 723. Subsequently the courts ruled that the seamen were entitled to their sailing papers before rather than after a hearing which measured up to
due process requirements, Lester v. Parker, 235 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'g
141 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Cal. 1956). Thereafter the Court of Appeals denied a petition
for rehearing. 237 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1956). However, the United States Court of
Claims held that, although the Coast Guard employed the procedure which the court

condemned in Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955), a shipmaster to whom
the Coast Guard refused to issue a certificate of loyalty, did not have the basis for
a claim against the United States which was within the class of cases cognizable in
that court. Dupree v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1956). The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the court below, then ruled that thshipmaster also could not make out a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
Dupree v. United States, 264 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1959), and 247 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.
1957), affg 146 F. Supp. 1948 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Greene;158 its earlier ruling in
Cole v. Young 9 " that the government's security program, set up in
President Eisenhower's Executive Order 10450,10° could not legally be
applied to an employee in a non-sensitive position; the holding of the
Ninth Circuit in Parker v. Lester;"' and hearings by the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights resulted in much discussion
of security questions, many recommendations for the reform of security
procedures, and some reconsideration and revision of security programs. However, an exception to the confrontation rule has remained
to protect the secret informer.
The most widely hailed of the recommendations for revision were
contained in a comprehensive report of a special committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.'
That report
suggested that witnesses be subject to cross-examination, under subpoena if necessary, unless the disclosure of his identity or the requirement of cross-examination would be injurious to national security.' 6 3
In other words, there was to be confrontation unless the government
decided, in the interest of secret informers, that there was not to be
confrontation.
Justice Samuel H. Hofstadter of the New York Supreme Court
criticized the special committee's retention of secret informers, and suggested that, in any case where they were used, the hearing board
appoint a public advocate who would be drawn from a panel of lawyers
with security clearances to cross-examine the secret witnesses - but
in the absence of the accused and his private counsel.' 64 This was the
farthest any proposal ever went toward the elimination of secret
informers.
In 1964 Congress passed a bill which gives the Secretary of
Defense summary power to dismiss employees of the National Security Agency.' 6 5 The American Civil Liberties Union asked President
Johnson to veto the measure because it gave the Secretary power to
effectuate such dismissals without a hearing, the right of cross-examination, the right to have information against the employee revealed, and
the right of appeal. Nevertheless, the bill became law.
158. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
159. 351 U.S. 536 (1956), rev'g 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'g 125 F.
Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1954).
160. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (Supp. 1953), 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970).
161. See text accompanying note 156 supra.

162. Bonsal, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, 11 Record of N.Y.C.B.A.
505 (1956).
163. Id. at 520.

164. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1956, § 4, at 10, col. 7; id., Oct. 17, 1956, at 18,
cols. 3-4.
8
165. by
50 Villanova
U.S.C. §University
33(a) Charles
(1970).Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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A 1966 act of Congress,166 after defining "agency" to include
the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice and Defense, a military
department, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and any other governmental agency the President designated, provides that the head
of an agency may suspend or remove an employee when "he determines that removal is necessary or advisable in the interests of national
security. ' 1' 6 7 An employee who has a permanent appointment is entitled, after suspension and before removal, to a written statement
of the charges against him, but these charges need to be stated only
"as specifically as security considerations permit."' 68
Counsel for clients in administrative or executive adjudicatory
hearings no matter what type of proceeding and no matter whether
on a state or federal level, should insist on the right to counsel, to a
hearing, and of confrontation and cross-examination as a matter of
due process. Ultimately the point will generally prevail.
Indeed, one has the impression that insistence of counsel on the
right to confrontation and cross-examination has already made an
impact, even in cases involving loyalty-security questions. Dick v.
United States69 furnishes an illustration. When Dr. Ronald Dick
submitted an application for a secret clearance, he was referred to
a Dr. Louis Linn, a psychiatric consultant for the Department of
Defense, for an evaluation. Dr. Linn had information from the files
of the Department of Defense that contained summaries of previous
examinations and statements from other people who had contact
with Dr. Dick. Based on this information and a personal interview,
Dr. Linn concluded that Dr. Dick had a paranoid personality. Neither
Dr. Dick nor his attorney were permitted to see the material from
the Department of Defense files. The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia sent the case back to the agency for
further proceedings. The court began its analysis with Greene v.
McElroy 70° and, relying on Goldberg v. Kelley' 7 ' and Escalera v. New
York City, 72 then stated:
Access to evidentiary material in the possession of an administrative body which will be considered and relied upon by that
body in making its ultimate determination should ordinarily be
afforded to the individual whose interest is at stake. Conversely,
166. 5 U.S.C. § 7531 (1970).
167. 5 U.S.C. § 7532(b) (1970).
168. 5 U.S.C. § 7532(c)(3)(A) (1970).
169. 399 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1972).
170. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See text accompanying note 143 supra.
171. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
172. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1

34

Rogge: An Overview of Administrative Due Process: Part I
NOVEMBER

1973]

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

the full panoply of due process safeguards need not necessarily
be afforded to the individual during the investigative, as opposed
to the adjudicative, phase of an administrative proceeding. 7 '
Nevertheless, the court gave the agency the choice of using the
procedures outlined in the Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Program which provides that the head of the department supplying the
material may certify "that the person who furnished the information
is a confidential informant who has been engaged in obtaining intelligence information for the Government and that disclosure of his
identity would be substantially harmful to the national interest."'7 4
However, the court did add: "The considerations previously discussed
respecting psychiatric testimony argue strongly in favor of disclosure
1 75
unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary."'
C.

Passports, Visas, and Aliens

The Department of State has consistently claimed that it can make
determinations with reference to the denial or issuance of passports
without confrontation; and, while the courts have never definitively
ruled against the Department's position, federal district judges have
divided on the question. In Boudin v. Dulles, 76 the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief from a decision of the Secretary of State refusing to
issue him a passport. 7 The refusal was based, in part, on confidential
information contained in the Secretary's files which indicated that the
plaintiff had been a member of the Communist Party. In remanding
the case to the Passport Office for further hearings, the court stated
that the concept of due process demanded that the decision to refuse
to issue a passport must be based upon evidence that appears on the
record. That requirement would assure that the applicant would have
the opportunity to meet it and that the court would have the ability
to review it.'7 "
In Dayton v. Dulles,1 7 however, the court, in circumstances similar
to Boudin, held that a refusal to issue a passport based in part on
173. 339 F. Supp. at 1233 (citations omitted).
174. 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(d) (5) (i) (1972).
175. 339 F. Supp. at 1234.
176. 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
177. The Secretary based the refusal upon section 51.135 of the Passport Regulations. That section empowered the Secretary to refuse passports to persons who
were members of the Communist Party or who had recently terminated such membership. 136 F. Supp. at 219-20.
178. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the order for a rehearing on the
grounds that the Secretary had failed to make the findings of fact sufficient to bring
the plaintiff within the scope of section 51.135. The court did not reach the question
of the propriety of the Secretary's use of confidential information. Boudin v. Dulles,
235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Published
Villanova
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Charles Widger
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confidential information was not a denial of due process. The court
of appeals affirmed, stating:
[T]he problem is whether disclosure would adversely affect our
internal security or the conduct of our foreign affairs. The cases
and common sense hold that the courts cannot compel the Secretary to disclose information garnered by him in confidence in
this area. If he need not disclose the information he has, the
only other course is for the courts to accept his assertion that
disclosure would be detrimental in fields of highest importance
entrusted80 to his exclusive care. We think we must follow that
1
course.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed, although it did not reach the
constitutional due process issue.'
When it comes to the granting or denial of visas by our officials
to aliens, and by foreign officials to residents of this country, there
is precious little that comes to light about the exercise of discretion by
administrative officials. Kleindienst v. Mande' 8 2 provides a brief,
exceptional glimpse of this limited area. The named appellee, Ernest E
Mandel, was a Belgian Marxist whose visa for an American speaking
tour in October and November 1969, was rejected by then Attorney
General John N. Mitchell. Section 212(d) (3) (A) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952"'3 empowered the Attorney General, in his
discretion upon the recommendation by the Secretary of State or a
consular officer, to waive inadmissibility of certain aliens ineligible to
receive visas and to approve temporary admission. Attorney General
Mitchell refused to exercise his discretion in Mandel's favor, whereupon Mandel and eight American scholars took Mitchell to court with
the result that a three-judge district court, by a 2-to-1 decision, held
section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
violative of the first amendment. The court reasoned:
Since the First Amendment is not in its primary and most
significant aspect a grant by the Constitution to the citizens of
individual right of self-expression but on the contrary reflects the
total retention by the people as sovereign to themselves of the
right to free and open debate of political questions, the issue of
"standing to sue" is immediately seen to be unreal. The concern
of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien's individual and personal interest in entering and being heard, but
with the rights of the citizens of the country to have the alien
180. 254 F.2d 71, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
181. 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
182. 408 U.S. 753 (1972), rev'g Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y.

1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (3) (A) (1970).
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enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views;
that . . . is of the essence of self-government.

Mandel's status

as a party does not rest on any individual right to enter (for
he has none) but exists only as against the effort to exclude
him on a ground that denies to citizens of this country their primary rights to hear Mandel and debate with him. Here the
plaintiffs other than Mandel are directly involved with Mandel's
entry because they have invited him, and they expect to be among
his auditors. No more is required to establish their standing .... 184
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding:
We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively
on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion,
nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with
the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may
be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no
justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case."'
The Court gave the following figures on the number of applications
for waivers of admissions requirements for the years 1967 through
1971 :186

Year

Total Number of
Applications
for Waiver of
Section 212(a) (28)

Number of
Waivers
Granted

Number of
Waivers
Denied

1971
1970
1969
1968
1967

6210
6193
4993
4184
3860

6196
6189
4984
4176
3852

14
4
9
8
8

However, these figures only represent those cases that come to the
Attorney General with a positive recommendation from the Secretary
of State or one of his consular officers. The figures do not include
those cases in which these officials refrained from making a positive
recommendation. That is an area of discretion that does not see
the light of day.
An alien, even one who is physically within the United States,
can expect somewhat less in the way of due process treatment at the
184. 325 F. Supp. at 631-32.
185. 408 U.S. at 770.
186. Id. at 768 n.7.
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hands of administrative officials than a citizen or a resident, 187 unless
the alien has a citizen or a resident spouse. Thus, an American citizen
who filed a visa petition for her husband was held entitled to be
confronted with, and given an opportunity to rebut an investigative
report and records that showed her husband had a wife and three
minor children in Mexico. 18 Significantly, the administrative agency
8 9
reached the conclusion on its own without any specific court prodding.
D.

Teachers -

Tenured and Untenured

Teachers at state supported colleges and schools have fared
moderately well at the hands of the courts in the extension of the
due process concept to administrative proceedings. A number of Supreme Court decisions provide a fairly comprehensive introduction
to the area: Perry v. Sindermann10° involving a teacher who claimed
tenure; Board of Regents v. Roth TM involving an untenured teacher;
Connell v. Higginbotham12 involving an untenured teacher who was
dismissed during the course of her employment; and Slochower v.
Board of Education 93 involving a tenured teacher who was summarily
dismissed.
Robert Sindermann had been a teacher for a decade in the state
college system of Texas. The Board of Regents, without a hearing,
declined to renew his contract for the next academic year. The college where Sindermann taught did not have formal tenure and he
had no written contractual right to reemployment. However, he
claimed tenure and further alleged that the decision not to rehire
him had been based on his public criticism of the policies of the
187. See, e.g., Aalund v. Marshall, 461 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1972); Tieri v. INS,
457 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1972).
Loyalty-Security questions have caused problems for naturalized citizens
and resident aliens. In Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), a denaturalization suit in which the government alleged that she had been a member of the
Young Communist League and Communist Party from 1933 to 1937, the Court held

that when the defendant took the stand and testified in her own behalf she waived
her privilege against self-incrimination as to matters made relevant by her direct
examination.
188. BIA, File A19 780 667, 41 U.S.L.W. 2256 (Milwaukee Oct. 27, 1972).
The revelant regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2) (1971), provide for inspection
of "the record of proceedings which constitutes the basis for the decision," but
contains the frequent exception "that classified evidence shall not be made available."
189. When considering problems in this area, it is interesting to note that, in
1971, a few weeks after Sol Marks became regional director of the New York City
office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, he set up the post of ombudsman. Recently, Mr. Marks explained that the ombudsman is a catalyst and a
sounding board who is "authorized to retrieve a case and review it - pry it loose
from delay as it were." See N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1973, at 51, col. 1.
190. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
191. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
192. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
193. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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college administration. The Court held that he was entitled to an
opportunity to establish that he had "tenure" and that if he could
prove that, "such proof would obligate college officials to grant a
hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds
for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency."' 94 The Fifth
Circuit, whose judgment the Court affirmed, had commented on college administrative procedures as follows:
School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate forums
for initially determining issues of this type, both for the convenience of the parties and in order to bring academic expertise
to bear in resolving the nice issues of administrative discipline,
teacher competence and school policy, which so frequently must
be balanced in reaching a proper determination. 9 '
In Roth, the Supreme Court confronted the dismissal of a professor who, unlike Prof. Sindermann, had been working for a short
while and was nontenured. David Roth had been hired as an assistant professor of political science in Wisconsin State UniversityOshkosh for the 1968-1969 academic year. Although he was rated
as an excellent teacher by the faculty, he had publicly characterized
the university's administration as being authoritarian and autocratic
and had criticized it for suspending a group of 94 black students without determining individual guilt. During the course of the academic
year he was told that he would not be rehired for the next academic
term, and he was never told why. The Court held that "he did not
have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities
to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of
employment."' 96 However, the Court went on to state: "Our analysis
of the respondent's constitutional rights in this case in no way indicates a view that an opportunity for a hearing or a statement of
reasons for nonretention would, or would not, be appropriate, or wise
in public colleges and universities.' 97
The opinion of the district court, whose judgment the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, and which was eventually reversed by the Supreme
Court, seems more persuasive:
Substantial constitutional protection for a university professor
against non-retention in violation of his First Amendment rights
or arbitrary non-retention is useless without procedural safeguards
194. 408 U.S. at 603.
195. 430 F.2d 939, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted in. Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 586 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
196. 408 U.S. at 578.
197. Id. at 578-79 (footnotes omitted).
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I hold that minimal procedural due process includes a statement
of the reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor, notice of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated
reasons, and a hearing if the professor appears at the appointed
time and place. At such a hearing the professor must have a
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the stated
reasons. The burden of going forward and the burden of proof
rests with the professor. Only if he makes a reasonable showing
that the stated reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for
decision or that they are wholly without basis in fact would the
university administration become obliged to show that the stated
reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact. 98
Through Roth and Sindermann, then, the Supreme Court defined
the due process rights which must be accorded state employed teachers
whose contracts are not renewed. When the teacher's interest in reemployment rises to a "property interest" it becomes protected by the
fourteenth amendment and he must be afforded notice and a hearing
at which he can challenge the sufficiency of the grounds for his nonretention. To reach that protected level the teacher's interest must
be more than a mere unilateral expectation. There must be a right
to re-employment which can be seen from the totality of the circumstances surrounding his employment. It may come from express tenure
status, from the employment contract, or as in Sindermann, may be
implied.
Stella Connell had been employed as a substitute classroom
teacher in the fourth grade of Callahan Elementary School in Orange
County, Florida. During the course of her employment she refused
to sign a loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees and
was dismissed. She brought suit in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge court held three of
the five clauses of the oath violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. The court further held that the plaintiff was under no obligation to sign an oath containing unconstitutional language, that she
was entitled to her salary for time spent teaching without pay, and
that she was entitled to the salary she would have received for the
rest of the school year. 99 The Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, holding, per curiam: "The second portion of the
oath, approved by the District Court, falls within the ambit of decisions
of this Court proscribing summary dismissal from public employment
198. 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-80 (W.D. Wis. 1970), quoted with approval by Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Roth. 408 U.S. at 585-86.

199. 305 F. Supp. 445, 454 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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without hearing or inquiry required by due process. That portion of
the oath, therefore, cannot stand."2 °
Harry Slochower, an associate professor of German at Brooklyn
College, was summarily dismissed under section 903 of the Charter
of the City of New York which made a claim of one's right of silence
an automatic basis for termination of employment without right to
charges, notice, or hearing. Professor Slochower, when called to testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, stated that he
was not a member of the Communist Party, and indicated complete
willingness to answer all questions about his associations or political
beliefs since 1941. However, he refused to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party during 1940 and 1941 on
the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. Shortly
after testifying he was notified that he was suspended from his teaching

position and, then, that he was dismissed. The New York courts upheld the application of section 903 and affirmed the dismissal.20 ' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding the dismissal violative of due process,
and stating that the treatment of Professor Slochower did not reflect
"the 'protection of the individual against arbitrary action' which Mr.
'20 2
Justice Cardozo characterized as the very essence of due process.
There are many comparable lower court rulings, some of which
go beyond the Supreme Court's rulings. The lower courts did so in
Roth.203 In Drown v. Portsmouth School District,20 4 a pre-Roth case,
the First Circuit held that an untenured public school teacher was
entitled to a statement of reason but not a hearing:
Courts are divided on the issue of the administrative procedural rights to which a non-tenured public school teacher is
entitled when he is not rehired. Some say that 'the teacher
has no right to an administrative hearing, although he does have
a legal remedy, if he was dismissed for constitutionally impermissible reasons such as his race or the exercise of First Amendment rights. Others have held that a non-tenured teacher is entitled to a hearing even when there is no allegation that the decision
not to rehire was made for constitutionally impermissible reasons.
Still others have taken a middle course, requiring administi'ative
hearings only when there is an allegation that a constitutionally
impermissible reason motivated the decision not to rehire.
200. 403 U.S. at 208.
201. 350 U.S. at 554-55.

202. 350 U.S. at 559.
203. See notes 196-98 and accompanying text supra.
204. 435 F.2d 1182 (Ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
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We . . . hold that the interests of the non-tenured teacher

in knowing the basis for his non-retention are so substantial and
that the inconvenience and disadvantages for a school board of
supplying this information are so slight as to require a written
explanation, in some detail, of the reasons for non-retention, together
with access to evaluation reports in the teacher's personnel
20 5
file.

The Fifth Circuit, in Ferguson v. Thomas,2° ' another pre-Roth,

pre-Sindermann case, held that a teacher with an expectancy of continued employment was entitled both to a statement of reason and a
hearing. The court considered that the "rudiments of due process fair
play" which it had delineated with regard to the rights of college
students subjected to disciplinary suspensions 2 7 were equally applicable
to teachers who had an expectancy of reemployment. While noting
that standards of procedural due process were not absolutes and may
vary with any given situation, the court stated that minimum procedural
due process required that a teacher who opposed his termination be
provided: (1) notice of the cause for termination in sufficient detail;
(2) notice of the names and nature of testimony of adverse witnesses;
(3) a meaningful opportunity to present his defense; and (4) a hearing before a panel which is impartial and possesses some academic
208

expertise.

As can be seen, cases involving teachers have presented a great
variety of factual situations. In Pickering v. Board of Education,"'

the Board of Education, after a full hearing, dismissed a teacher for
writing and publishing a letter in a newspaper criticizing the Board's
allocation of school funds between educational and athletic programs.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, concluded:
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof
of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.210
The Fifth Circuit decided, in Rainey v. Jackson State College,2 1 1
that the complaint of an assistant professor of English at a Mississippi
205. 435 F.2d at 1183-84, 1185 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). After
remand, the school board gave Patricia Drown the reasons for nonrenewal of her
contract. She then attacked the reasons as being arbitrary and capricious, but this time
the courts ruled against her. 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
206. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
207. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
208. 430 F.2d at 856.
209. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
210. Id. at 574 (footnotes omitted).
211. 435 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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state college which alleged that he had been denied a hearing by the
college's board of trustees on his charge that his contract of employment had not been renewed due to his testimony for the defense in
a criminal obscenity case stated a cause of action under Section 1983
21 2
of the Civil Rights Act.
The Seventh Circuit held, in Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515,218 that a college president had almost as great
a right of free speech as a teacher. In that case, a college president
alleged that he had been fired because of an administrative staff
memorandum in which he made recommendations for changes in the
Ethnic Studies Program. The Seventh Circuit concluded that in the
absence of actual proof that the circulation of the memorandum inpaired the effectiveness of a close relationship with the school board,
the memorandum was within the protection of the first amendment.
In Duke v. North Texas State University214 the Fifth Circuit
considered the case of a teaching assistant whose offer of reemployment
had been rescinded following a speech she made at a rock concert that
she had helped organize. In the speech she stated that the "system,"
as represented on the local level at the university, "fucks over" students.
The district court ordered her fully reinstated according to the terms
of the contract that had been offered to her.215 The Fifth Circuit
reversed on the ground that the faculty committee which comprised
the panel that heard the case on the university level had possessed
an apparent impartiality toward the charges.2

16

Cases involving teachers present not only the ordinary controversial
issues but also their quota of loyalty security questions. An illustrative recent case is Keyishian v. Board of Regents,21" wherein the Supreme Court held that portions of New York's complicated Feinberg
Law were "invalid insofar as they proscribe[d] mere knowing membership without any showing of specific intent to further the unlawful
aims of the Communist Party of the United States or of the State
of New York. '218 Those provisions suffered "from impermissible
'overbreadth.' "219
212. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1970).
213. 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
214. 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1973).
215. 338 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Tex. 1971).

216. 469 F.2d at 834.
217. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
218. Id. at 609-10.
219. Id. at 609. To the extent of this holding, the Court rejected Adler v. Board

of Educ.,
U.S. University
485 (1952).
Published
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The Keyishian Court, through Justice Brennan, stated:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over that classroom.2 2
As was seen with Connell,221 loyalty-security questions involving
teachers have also arisen in cases challenging the requirements of
loyalty oaths. The Supreme Court has usually invalidated such oaths
on due process grounds: in Baggett v. Bullitt,222 the Court held that

the oath requirements of the State of Washington, and the statutory
provisions on which they were based, were invalid on their face
since they were "unduly vague, uncertain and broad"

;223

in Cramp

v. Board of Public Instructions, 214 the Court held that a Florida
oath requirement and statute were unconstitutionally vague; and in
Wieman v. Updegraff,2 25 the court stated, with reference to an Oklahoma statute, that its "[i]ndiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The
oath offends due process.

'226

An Arkansas statute compelled every teacher, as a condition of
employment in a state-supported school or college, to file an annual
affidavit listing, without limitation, every organization to which he
belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five years. In
Shelton v. Tucker.27 the Court invalidated it, stating, through Justice
Stewart: "It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his
every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which,
' 228
like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.
However, school authorities may inquire as to a teacher's Communist affiliations in order to pass upon his fitness to teach. The
Court so held in Adler v. Board of Education,22 9 wherein it stated
that "school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the
220. 385 U.S. at 603.
221. See notes 199-200 and accompanying text supra.

222. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
223.
loyalty
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 366; accord, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)
oath invalidated for overbreadth).
368 U.S. 278 (1961).
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Id. at 191.
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
Id. at 485-86.
342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the
integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society ....
E.

Public Employees

Public employees generally have fared almost as well as teachers
in the application of due process concepts to administrative proceedings.
Norlander v. Schleck28 ' is a case which illustrates the extent to which
the law has developed in this area. Judith Norlander applied for a
position as a clerk-typist with the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, a classified Civil Service position. She passed the requisite competitive typing examination and was notified that she had been assigned number
52 on the eligible or waiting list. In her application she had listed
her employment history. After she was notified of her successful examination, her former employers and perhaps others were queried by
means of a standard form which stated, in part, that all replies were
to be held "strictly confidential." Subsequently, she was notified in
writing that her name had been removed from the eligible list "because of unsatisfactory references." She requested information about
the specific reasons for such removal and the substance of the charges.
When her requests were denied, she went to court. The federal district court decided in her favor, holding that "timely notice of the
bases of decisions and a reasonable opportunity afforded for refutation" was required.2 8 2 The court relied on the Eighth Circuit's opinion
in Cooley v. Board of Education,238 a case involving a teacher, and,
adding its own emphasis, quoted from that opinion:
The jurisprudential basis upon which the constitutional doctrine of procedural Due Process rests is the judicially-created notion that when Government acts so as to affect substantial and
protected individual interests or to adjudicate important and protected rights, the Due Process Clause requires, in the absence of a
significant countervailing governmental interest, that Government
supply procedures which guarantee at least a modicum of fairness

....

284

Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian analyst who, in 1968, exposed to the
Senate-House Joint Economic Committee a $2 billion cost overrun
by Lockheed on the giant C5A, appealed to the Civil Service Com230. Id. at 493; accord, Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
For other cases involving teachers see Appendix I infra.
231. 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972).
232. Id. at 600.
233. 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972).
234. 345 F. Supp. at 597, quoting Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282, 285

(8th Cir. 1972).
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mission after he was dismissed through the subterfuge of having his
job abolished. He contended that he was, in fact, illegally fired from
his job in retaliation for the testimony he had given. The Commission granted him a hearing, but denied his numerous requests that it
be open to the public and the press. Fitzgerald sought relief in the
federal district court, which held that, contrary to the position taken
by the Commission, due process required an open and public hearing
and enjoined the Commission from holding any further hearings closed
to the public and the press. The court of appeals affirmed, 235 stating:
"Where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings,"
the protections afforded by due process of law entitles the individual to a fair opportunity to show that the governmental action
was unwarranted. Many of these protections have been formalized
from those expressed in the Sixth Amendment, which provides
that the accused in all criminal cases shall have the right "to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," to be informed
of the "nature and cause of the accusation," "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him," to have "compulsory process for
and "to have the Assistance
obtaining witnesses in his23 favor,"
6
of Counsel for his defense."
The Government contended that a regulation of the Commission specifically excluded the public and the press from its hearings.2 3 7 The
court of appeals was unimpressed and replied that since the purpose
of keeping the hearings "closed to the public and press" was, as the
government claimed to protect the individual involved, the individual
23 8
could waive them.

On the other hand, if an administrative agency does not follow
its rules and the individual is injured and objects, courts will correct
the error. In Service v. Dulles23 9 the Court held that the dismissal
of a foreign service officer by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
could not stand when the dismissal was in violation of Department
of State regulations.
Likewise, when the director of the Montana office of the Federal
Housing Administration was dismissed on such charges as (1) failure
to exercise leadership qualities, (2) display of poor judgment, and
(3) failures in maintaining effective personal working relationships
235. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
236. Id. at 763.

237. 5 C.F.R. § 772.305(c) (3) (1972).
238. 467 F.2d at 767. Contra, Kelly v. Sterr, 62 N.J. 105, 299 A.2d 390 (1973),
petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 9, 1973) (No. 72-1514).
239. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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with firms doing business with the FHA, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ruled in his favor on the dual
grounds that the charges were insufficiently specific, and that they
were not listed in the "Table of Miscellaneous Offenses" in the agency's
Handbook for FHA Employees.'4" It has also been held that termination of employment without an explanation of the employee's right
to reply to the suspension notice or his right, ultimately, to appeal,
when such an explanation is required by the applicable regulations,
24 1
is violative of due process.

In Kennedy v. Sanchez, 242 a three-judge court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that the procedures and standards which were
followed in the discharge of a field representative of the Chicago branch
of the Office of Economic Opportunity violated both the fifth amendment requirement of due process and the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech. The applicable statutory provisions and attendant
regulations provided that employees receive not less than 30 days
notice and be granted an appeal in which they were to be afforded
a full evidentiary hearing. The court concluded that the failure to
provide a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination with the attendant rights to be heard by an impartial hearing officer, to present
witnesses, to confrontation, and to a written decision setting forth
the reasons for discharge and supporting evidence rendered the statutory scheme violative of due process.2 43 That decision has been appealed, and the Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction.
As usual, some cases concerning public employees have involved
loyalty-security questions. Where such cases have arisen from the requirement for loyalty oaths, the Court has often struck the oaths
down. It did so in Baggett v. Bullitt2.. with reference to the loyalty
oath requirement of the State of Washington, and, as previously seen
in Connell v. Higginbotham24 5 and Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction 24 with reference to Florida's statutory provisions for loyalty oaths.
The Court has also declared a provision of the Subversive Activities
240. Massman v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 332 F. Supp. 894 (D.D.C.
1971).
241. Clarke v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Va. 1972).
242. 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972), probable jurisdiction noted sub non.

Phillips v. Kennedy, 411 U.S. 915 (1973).
243. The court further held that 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970) was unconstitutionally vague in authorizing the removal and suspension without pay "for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service." 349 F. Supp. at 866.
244. 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; accord, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)

(Arizona loyalty oath invalidated for overbreadth).
245. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
246. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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Control Act of 1950 an unconstitutional abridgement of the first amendment right of association.247
However, government authorities are entitled to question employees about Communist Party affiliations in order to determine their
fitness for their jobs. The Court so held in Lerner v. Casey248 with
reference to a subway conductor employed by the New York City
Transit Authority, and in Garner v. Board of Public Works 240 which
involved Civil Service employees of the City of Los Angeles.
F.

Government Contractors

Due process, of course, applies to property rights as well as to
personal rights. So in Gonzalez v. Freeman250 when the Commodity
Credit Corporation, without notice or hearing, first suspended and then
barred the plaintiffs for five years from participating in certain contracts, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that it could not be done. The Commodity Credit Corporation felt
that the plaintiffs had misused official inspection certificates relating
to commodities exported to Brazil. The court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger held:
On this record there is neither the appearance nor the reality
of fairness in the process by which debarment of appellants was
accomplished. Disqualification from bidding or contracting for five
years directs the power and prestige of government at a particular
person and, as we have shown, may have a serious economic impact on that person. Such debarment cannot be left to administrative improvisation on a case-by-case basis. The governmental
power must be exercised in accordance with accepted basic legal
norms. Considerations of basic fairness require administrative
regulations establishing standards for debarment and procedures
which will include notice of specific charges, opportunity to pre247. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). Robel involved a member
of the Communist Party who remained an employee of a shipyard after it had been
designated a defense facility by the Secretary of Defense. The statute made it
unlawful for a member of a "Communist-action" organization to "engage in employment" at any designated defense facility if the organization was registered pursuant
to the Act or if there was an outstanding final order that the organization register.
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 § 5(a) (1) (D), 64 Stat. 992 (1950),
as amended 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1970). The Court stated that that section
of the statute contained "the fatal defect of overbreadth because it seeks to bar
employment both for association which may be proscribed and for association which
may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment rights." 389 U.S. at 303.
Cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), where the Court invalidated as an unconstitutional bill of attainder a rider to an appropriation act by which
Congress provided that no salary or other compensation was to be paid to three
government employees whom Congress thought to be subversive.
248. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
249. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
For other cases involving public employees, see Appendix II infra.
250. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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sent evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, all culminating in administrative
findings and conclusions based upon
251
the record so made.

Scanwell Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer5 2 involved bids submitted
to the Federal Aviation Administration for instrument landing systems to be installed at airports. An unsuccessful bidder brought suit
to have the award to the successful bidder declared null and void
because it was in violation of applicable statutory provisions and supporting regulations. The first question the court had to consider
was the standing of a frustrated bidder to sue. Although the court
conceded that a finding that the award was illegal did not mean the
frustrated bidder had a right to the award, it nevertheless recognized
the frustrated bidder's standing to sue as a sort of private attorney
general, stating:
The public interest in preventing the granting of contracts through
arbitrary or capricious action can properly be vindicated through
a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a result of the illegal
activity, but the suit itself is brought in the public '25interest
by
3
one acting essentially as a "private attorney general.

In Rudolph F. Matzer & Associates, Inc. v. Warner25 4 a naval
agent, in violation of applicable regulations, gave inside information
to the successful bidder. The court set aside the award. After conceding that courts must refrain from intervention in governmental procurement processes unless the actions of the executive officials were
without any rational basis, the court continued:
The corollary of this rule is that if procurement officials act in
a manner for which there is no rational basis in applicable law,
they have exceeded their legislative mandate and courts have a
duty to give relief as sought in the present case. This judicial
duty also arises when a procurement official exercises discretion,
which is concededly his under applicable law, in an abusive, unlawful or irrational manner.2 55
However, in the procurement process as well as in certain other
areas, one will find the courts reluctant to step in because, in the words
251. Id. at 578; cf. Horne Brothers, Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
252. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
253. Id. at 864. In International Eng'r Co. v. Richardson, 42 "U.S.L.W. 2076
(D.D.C. July 10, 1973), the court decided that an Air Force contracting officer's
decision to remove a contractor's proprietary legend from data that it submitted
pursuant to a contractual requirement was subject to judicial review.
254. 348 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
255. byId.
at 995.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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of the Administrative Procedure Act, "agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law." 2" 6 However, it is that very discretion
that the writer would like to see harnessed.
G.

Students

Students in state-supported schools and colleges have fared almost as well as teachers when it comes to the application of due
process concepts to administrative proceedings involving them. A leading case is Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,257 in which
the Fifth Circuit held that "due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported college [can
25
' 8
be] expelled for misconduct.
The student plaintiffs in Dixon had entered a publicly owned lunchroom located in the basement of the County Court House in Montgomery, Alabama and asked to be served. Service was refused and the
lunchroom closed. When the students, blacks, refused to leave, police
authorities were summoned and they were ordered out. They left
the lunchroom but remained in the corridor of the courthouse for approximately one hour. On the same day Governor John Patterson,
as Governor of Alabama and chairman of the State Board of Education, told Dr. Trenholm, president of Alabama State College, that
the incident should be investigated and that if he were in the president's
position he would consider expulsion. Subsequently, among other
things, the students staged mass demonstrations. After one such demonstration on the steps of the state capital, the plaintiffs were summarily
expelled. They sought injunctive relief in federal district court alleging that they were expelled solely because they had attempted to
exercise their civil rights and had sought to be served at a public
256. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (1970). See, e.g., Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee,
455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289
(D.C. Cir. 1971). In the latter case the court nevertheless stated:
We do not recede from our expression in Scanwell of the beneficial purposes
served by frustrated bidders who, as "private attorney generals," can aid in
furthering the public interest in the integrity of the procurement process. The
courts are properly concerned that the procurement activities of the Government
be carried out in accordance with the applicable statutes and agency regulations
and that these governmental functions not be permitted to deteriorate into
actions reflecting personal predelictions [sic] of administrative officials, whether

ascribable to whim, misplaced zeal, or impermissible influence. However the
public interest in a Government procurement process that proceeds with expedition is likewise of importance. The court must refrain from judicial intervention into the procurement process unless the actions of the executive officials
are without any rational basis.
Id. at 1305-06.
257. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
258. Id. at 158.
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lunchroom. They claimed that the expulsion without notice or opportunity to defend violated their constitutional rights. The district court
refused relief holding that the action taken against the students was
not arbitrary, was justified, and did not deprive the students of any
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.2 1 9 Reversing, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[w]henever a governmental body acts as to injure
an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be consonant with
due process of law."' 26 ° Recognizing that the procedural requirements
necessary to satisfy due process vary with the circumstances and the
interests involved, the court, as noted above, held that in this instance
due process required notice and some opportunity for hearing. 26 1 The
court then explained its view of the standards that notice and hearing
should meet:
The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and
grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the hearing
should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case. The case before us requires something more than an informal interview with an administrative authority of the college.
By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure
to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a
collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily
colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative
authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in
considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing,
with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a
hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college
activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without
encroaching upon the interests of the college. In the instant case,
the student should be given the names of the witnesses against
him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each
witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to
present to the Board, or at least to an administrative official
of the college, his own defense against the charges and to produce
either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.
If the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results and
259. 186 F. Supp. 945, 952 (M.D. Ala. 1960), rev'd, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
260. 294 F.2d at 155.
261. byId.
at 158.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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should be presented in a report open to
findings of the hearing 262
the student's inspection.

A recent case that made headlines in the Midwest, Behagen v.
Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 23 involved two
members of the University of Minnesota varsity bastketball team who
were suspended without notice or a hearing for the remainder of the
then current basketball season because of their participation in an altercation during a basketball game with Ohio State University. The
federal district court held that the suspension violated due process
and, while noting that the procedural requirements of due process
may vary with the situation, described, as had the Fifth Circuit in
Dixon, what it considered to be the relevant due process requirements:
Plaintiffs should be given a written notice of the time and place
of the hearing at least two days in advance. Accompanying such
notice should be a specification of the charges against each, and
the grounds which, if proven, would justify imposition of a penalty.
The hearing should be such that the Directors of Athletics have
an opportunity to hear both sides of the story. This does not
require a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to crossexamine witnesses. However, it should include the presentation
of direct testimony in the form of statements by each of those
directly involved relating their versions of the incident. Plaintiffs
should be given a list of all witnesses who will appear, and should
be allowed to hear all testimony. Plaintiffs should be given a
written report specifying the Directors' findings of fact, and if
there is to be any punishment the basis for such punishment. The
proceedings should be recorded, and the tapes should be made
available to plaintiffs in the event they wish to appeal to the
Faculty Representatives, as is their right pursuant to § VI(C)
para. 4 of the Handbook. If these minimal standards are followed in cases of this nature, it is this Court's opinion that the
requirements of due process will have been met.264
Givens v. Poe 265 is another case which illustrates the need for
the recognition of due process principles in school administrative proceedings. The case was a class action brought by three black students
who had been excluded from school without notice or an opportunity
to be heard. The federal district court, noting that the question presented was the due process, or fairness, of the procedures by which
discipline was administered in public schools, and not the substantive
262. Id. at 158-59.
263. 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972).
264. Id. at 608.
265. 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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correctness of the punishment itself, granted the plaintiffs detailed re-

lief.266 The court reviewed the applicable due process requirements
stating:
The Supreme Court has written no blueprint. However, where
exclusion or suspension for any considerable period of time is
a possible consequence of proceedings, modern courts have held
that due process requires a number of procedural safeguards such
as: (1) notice to parents and student in the form of a written
and specific statement of the charges which, if proved, would
justify the punishment sought; (2) a full hearing after adequate
notice and (3) conducted by an impartial tribunal; (4) the right
to examine exhibits and other evidence against the student; (5)
the right to be represented by counsel (though not at public
expense); (6) the right to confront and examine adverse witnesses; (7) the right to present evidence on behalf of the student;
(8) the right to make a record of the proceedings; and (9) the
requirement that the decision of the authorities be based upon
267
substantial evidence.

The court noted that while not all courts which had considered the
question had required all the items listed, all the items appeared to
it to be essential if the substance and appearance of fairness were to
be preserved.

268

In a case in which four black girls were accused of assaulting
two white students the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
public school student charged with misconduct has the right to demand
that witnesses against him appear in person to answer questions. If
the witnesses did not do so their statement would not be considered
26 9
or relied upon by the board.

It may come as a surprise to some - it came as a shock to
the writer - that there are still school districts which have regulations
266. Interestingly, the court traced the due process concept back to the Periclean age:
Due process of law is not an American invention. It seems to have been a
trademark of civilization for thousands of years. By the age of Pericles (5th
Century B.C.), the concept of fair hearing seems to have been accepted; the
chorus in Aristophanes' legal satire, "The Wasps," chanted that
"T'was a very acute and intelligent man,
whoever it was, that happened to say,
Don't make up your mind till you've heard
both sides."
When the Apostle Paul was put on trial in the first century A.D. before Festus,
that Roman governor refused to proceed against him without a hearing, reporting
to King Agrippa that
"It was not the custom of the Romans to give up anyone before the
accused met the accusers face to face and had opportunity to make
his defense concerning the charge laid against him."
346 F. Supp. at 207.
267. Id. at 209.
Published
268. by
Id.Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
269. Tibbs v. Board of Educ., 59 N.J. 506, 284 A.2d 179 (1971).
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providing for corporal punishment. Northgate School District in Pennsylvania is one such district. Pursuant to its regulations corporal punishment was administered to a 12-year-old seventh grade student. His
mother, on his behalf and in her own right, took the superintendent
and others to court. In the writer's view, corporal punishment violates
due process. However, the district court would not go that far, although it did hold that corporal punishment was not to be inflicted
on "a child whose parents have notified the appropriate authorities
that such disciplinary method is prohibited."27
As should be apparent, cases involving students have arisen from
almost as great a variety of situations as have cases involving teachers.
In addition to those cases already discussed they have, for example,
also grown out of disputes concerning dress codes, 27' the marriage of
high school students,2 72 student intoxication, 27 1 the treatment of mentally
retarded, emotionally disturbed and hyperactive students, 274 and ad27
is illusmission policies.2 75 The case of Papish v. Board of Curators
trative of the first amendment issues often involved in student cases.
In Papish, a 32-year-old graduate student was dismissed from the
University of Missouri after distributing an underground newspaper
that contained a cartoon which depicted helmeted, club-wielding policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice, and
an article bearing the headline "Motherfucker Acquitted." At the time
of her dismissal, the student was on academic and disciplinary probation, had been "pursuing" her graduate degree for 6 years, while making little, if any, academic progress. She was dismissed for violation
of a university rule of conduct after receiving written charges and a
"full and fair" hearing. 27 7 The student sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that her dismissal was violative of the first
and fourteenth amendments. The district court denied relief and was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit which held the dismissal valid stating:
270. Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
271. See text accompanying note 290 infra.
272. E.g., Moran v. School Dist., 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972) (enforcement of a rule preventing married students from participating in extracurricular
activities enjoined pending a hearing and a final decision on the merits).
273. E.g., Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972) (readmission of a
15-year-old student ordered pending a hearing on the merits of a charge of appearing
in school in an intoxicated condition).
274. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (failure to provide
children labeled as behavior problems, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
hyperactive with publically supported specialized education held violative of both
controlling statutes and due process requirements).
275. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973) (admission preference accorded minority group students not violative of equal protection).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
276. 410 U.S. 667 (1973), rev'g 464 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1972).
277. The Eighth Circuit so characterized the hearing. 464 F.2d at 138.
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From what we hear said it is clear that the University action in
this case cannot fairly be described as arbitrary, unreasonable or
capricious. In point of fact, this is one of those cases, not at all
unfamiliar in student-school litigation, where disciplinary action
resulting from crass and absurd conduct is sought to be made
redressable by characterizing the underlying factual events in
2 7
constitutional terms.

1

The Supreme Court, however, reversed per curiam, with the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissenting, and ordered
reinstatement.2

7

'

The Court stated:

Since the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation
of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to
the content of speech, and because the state University's action
here cannot be justified as a nondiscriminatory application of reasonable rules governing conduct, the judgments of the courts below
must be reversed .... 280
Another illustrative case involving an underground newspaper is
Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District.28 ' A group of high

school students authored, published, and distributed an underground
newspaper entitled "Awakening." The newspaper was prepared during
out-of-school hours, without the use of any materials or facilities owned
or operated by the school system. The students distributed the papers
one afternoon after school hours and one morning before school hours.
At all times distribution was carried on near the school but outside
the school premises on the sidewalk of an adjoining street separated
from the school by a parking lot. The issue of "Awakening" that upset
the school board was one that contained two statements which the
board regarded as too controversial: a statement advocating a review
of the laws with reference to marijuana; and another statement offering
information on, among other things, birth control. For the distribution of this issue the five plaintiffs were suspended. The Fifth Circuit
held that the defendants acted unconstitutionally. The court began
its opinion by stating:
It should have come as a shock to the parents of five high
school seniors . . . that their elected school board had assumed

suzerainty over their children before and after school, off school
grounds, and with regard to their children's rights of expressing
their thoughts. We trust that it will come as no shock whatsoever
278. Id. at 145.
279. 410 U.S. at 671.

280.byId.
Published
Villanova
at 671.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973

281. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
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to the school board that their assumption of authority is an unconstitutional usurpation of the First Amendment."'2
The court concluded with these poignant comments:
Perhaps it would be well if those entrusted to administer the
teaching of American history and government to our students
began their efforts by practicing the document on which that
history and government are based. Our eighteen-year-olds can
now vote, serve on juries, and be drafted; yet the board fears
the "awakening" of their intellects without reasoned concern for
its effect upon school discipline. The First Amendment cannot
tolerate such intolerance.28 8
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District2 8 4 three high school
students in Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands to publicize their
objections to the Vietnam war. For this they were all sent home
and suspended from school until they would come back without their
armbands. The Supreme Court held the suspension to be violative of
their first amendment rights, stating:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and
students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression
at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding
of this Court for almost 50 years ... "'
The Board of Education of the Memphis City schools gave one
student the choice of participating in the ROTC program, or forfeiting
his high school diploma. The Sixth, Circuit held that the state could
not subject him "to such a Hobson's choice consistent with the Constitution ...."s286
In Wood v. Davison2 7 a group of students at the University of
Georgia, members of a Committee on Gay Education, a homosexual
group, sought permission to use the facilities of the University of
Georgia for a conference and a dance to be sponsored by the Committee
on Gay Education. The administrative officials of the University of
Georgia denied the request, and the students took them to court. The
federal district court restrained the denial of the facilities, stating:
282. Id. at 964.
283. Id. at 978.
284. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
285. Id. at 506. But cf. Williams v. Eaton, 408 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972)
(black athletes of the University of Wyoming football team dismissed after a dispute
over their intentions to wear black armbands during a football game with Brigham
Young University).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
286. Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1972).
287. 351 F. Supp. at 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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[I]t is not the prerogative of college officials to impose their own
preconceived notions and ideals on the campus by choosing among
proposed organizations, providing access to some and denying
a forum to those with which they do not agree. 8 8
Although students, unlike teachers, do not have to take loyalty
oaths, their cases do involve loyalty questions as well as other controversial issues. As was noted previously, Healy v. James2M9 involved the formation of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS).
The controversial issue that has most frequently arisen in cases
relating to students has been that of hairstyle and dress. This issue
has also troubled teachers and other public employees, members of the
armed forces and prisoners; but it has troubled students most of all.
What the courts have done has depended upon their views of constitu-

tional law as to whether students had the right -

either under the

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or under the ninth
amendment, or under emanations from the Federal Bill of Rights or
in its penumbra - to their own hairstyle and dress. As Justice
Douglas wrote in his dissent from denial of certiorari in one of the

hair cases: "There are well over 50 reported cases squarely presenting
the issue, students having won in about half of them."29

The Supreme Court referred to the problem in Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist. :291 "The problem posed by the present case
does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of

clothing, to hair style, or deportment.

292

But so far the Court has

293

refused to take the issue.
288. Id. at 549.

289. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).

See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra.
290. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1046 n.5 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
291. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
292. Id. at 507-08.
293. See, e.g., Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1032 (1972) ; King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972). In Freeman v. Flake, supra, Justice
Douglas wrote in dissent:
Today the Court declines to decide whether a public school may constitutionally refuse to permit a student to attend solely because his hair style meets
with the disapproval of the school authorities. The Court also denied certiorari
in Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S. 1042, which presented
the same issue. I dissented in Olff, and filed an opinion. For the same reasons
expressed therein, I dissent today. I add only that now eight circuits have
passed on the question. On widely disparate rationales, four have upheld school
hair regulations (see Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971); King
v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); Jackson
v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970): and Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School District, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir: 1968)), and four have struck them
down
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Selective Service Classification Orders

Another large area of administrative determinations that involve
an individual's liberty and may put his life in jeopardy is the issuance
of Selective Service classification orders. Yet, the applicable regulation still provides: "That no registrant may be represented before the
local board by anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel."2 ' The
courts have usually sustained this regulation.2" 5 The Supreme Court

has not yet decided the issue. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, in dismissing the indictment in
United States v. Weller,2"' held that this provision was either unauthorized or unconstitutional. The Supreme Court heard argument but
concluded that the appeal was not properly there and remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit.
The Military Selective Service Act as amended in September
1971, contained a new section entitled "Procedural Rights."2 7 This
section gives the registrant the right to appear in person before the
local or any appeal board in order to testify and present evidence
regarding his status; to present witnesses on his behalf before the local
board; to have a quorum of the board present for any hearings; and,
upon request, to have a brief, written statement of the reasons for
any adverse decisions. There is, however, no provision for the right
to counsel.
450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir.
1970) ; and Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) ).
I can conceive of no more compelling reasons to exercise our discretionary
jurisdictions than a conflict of such magnitude, on an issue of importance bearing
on First Amendment and Ninth Amendment rights.
405 U.S. at 1032. The writer collected the cases in Rogge, Williams v. Florida: End
of a Theory (pt. 2), 16 VILL. L. REv. 607, 699-701 (1971).
In Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. en banc 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 412 (1973), the Fifth Circuit en banc refused to extend Karr
v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. en banc 1972) (high school hair regulation
sustained) to college students.
The Tenth Circuit recently followed its Freeman v. Flake ruling in New
Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973). For a recent case to the
contrary, see Mick v. Sullivan, 476 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1973) ("the right to choose
one's hairstyle is one aspect of the right to be secure in one's person guaranteed by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 973).
For other cases involving students, see Appendix III infra.
294. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1972).
295. See, e.g., McAndrew v. Selective Serv. Bd., 438 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) ; United States v. Evans, 425 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1970)
United States v. Tantash, 409 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969)
Haven v. United States, 403 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Dicks,
392 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Nickerson v. United States, 391 F.2d 760 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907 (1968); United States v. Capson, 347 F.2d 959
(10th Cir. 1965).
296. 309 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1969), remanded, 401 U.S. 254 (1971), appeal
dismissed 466 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1972).
297. Military Selective Service Act, Title I, § 101(a)(36), 50 U.S.C. App.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
§ 47 1a (Supp. 11 1972).
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In December 1972, the Administrative Conference of the United
States, at its eighth plenary session in Washington, D.C., adopted the
recommendation of its Committee on Judicial Review encouraging the
Selective Service System to amend its procedural regulations in order
to allow the representation of registrants by counsel, and to provide
for the preparation of suitable transcripts of local board and appeal
board proceedings. The recommendation also called for pre-induction
review of Selective Service classification orders.2 8 Section 10(b) (3)
of the Military Selective Service Act forbids judicial review of administrative determinations relating to the classification or processing of
any registrant except as a defense to a criminal prosecution. 299
However, if the Selective Service System goes beyond the limits
of authorized discretions - and sometimes even if it exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner - or fails to follow its own
regulations, or violations constitutional rights, the courts will, with reluctance, give relief. A trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Gonzales v.
United States,80 0 Simmons v. United States 0 ' and Sicurella v. United
States10 2 is illustrative.

In each case, the petitioner was a member

of Jehovah's Witnesses and claimed exemption as a conscientious objector. In Gonzales the Department of Justice had not furnished the
petitioner with a copy of its adverse recommendation to the appeal
board. Although the applicable statute did not expressly require this,
the Court found that such a requirement was implicit in the act and
regulations in order that the individual be afforded an opportunity
to reply. Accordingly, the Court reversed petitioner's conviction for
refusing to submit to induction.
In Simmons, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to a
fair summary of the material in a FBI report on him. Because he had
not received such a summary, the Court reversed his conviction for refusal to submit to induction. Simmons stands somewhat in contrast
to United States v. Nugent 3 wherein the Court sanctioned the use
of secret informers in Selective Service proceedings.
In Sicurella one of the grounds on which the appeal board made
the classification was invalid. Since it was impossible to say on which
ground the appeal board decided, the Court reversed the resulting
80 4

conviction.

298. See 41 U.S.L.W. 2326, 2327 (Dec. 26, 1972).
299. 50 U.S.C.A. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. 1973). See Fein v. Selective Serv. Sys.,

405 U.S. 365 (1972).

300. 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
301. 348 U.S. 397 (1955).

302. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).

303. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
304. The Court recently followed Sicurella in Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698
(1971). But cf. United States v. Francis, 457 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
Published
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
U.S. 940by(1972).
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In several cases, the courts have granted relief to inductees because the local board, or appeal board as the case was, considered so
many cases at a particular sitting that the courts concluded the registrants were not accorded due process. In United States v. Wallen, °5
a conscientious 'objector case, an appeal board acted upon 122 field
cases at a two-hour meeting; in Slettehaugh v. Tarr, °6 a hardship
deferment case, 'an appeal board considered 262 cases in a period of
43/4 hours; and in United States v. Weaver,30 7 another conscientious
objector case, a local board considered and voted on 449 cases during
the course of two hours. In Wallen, the district court reasoned:
It does not require lengthy argument to this court to convince that a 59 second appeal is not a meaningful appeal proceeding. It is almost a routine "rubber stamp" operation. It is a
hearing or meeting at which, under the present regulations, defendant is not entitled to be present....
• . * The proceeding is offensive to the concept of due process
and the indictment in defendant's case should be dismissed for
failure of the appeal board to have afforded defendant meaningful rights as guaranteed under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment." 8
In United States v. Saunders,"°9 the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of conviction of a registrant who failed to report for induction after he had been reclassified by his local board on the basis
of a letter written by his former brother-in-law. The appeal board
had relied on both that letter and one from the registrant's former
wife when rejecting his appeal of the reclassification. The Fourth
Circuit held that fundamental fairness required that the registrant be
afforded an opportunity to rebut the letters.
In United States v. Cabbages1" the secretary of a local board put
in a registrant's file, without the registrant's knowledge, a summary
of an FBI report that charged he was trying to organize Black Power
followers and was being closely watched by the FBI. The Sixth Circuit
held that the action constituted a due process violation.
305. 315 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1970).
306. 322 F. Supp. 180 (D. Minn. 1971).
307. 336 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
308. 315 F. Supp. at 460-61. But cf. United States v. Young, 324 F. Supp. 69
(D. Minn. 1970).
309. 467 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1972) ; accord, United States v. Thompson, 431 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir. 1970).
310. 430 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1970) ; accord, United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383
(8th Cir. 1969). In United States v. Ford, 431 F.2d 1310 (1st Cir. 1970), the First
Circuit invalidated an induction order because the clerk of a local board sent two
letters to the local board to the armed forces examining and entrance station so
that the board did not see them. The letters were from two doctors and described
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
the registrant's deep neurosis.
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The courts have also given relief when the local board's action
has had no apparent basis in fact. One such case was United States
v. Jarztis.3 ' Malcolm Jarvis was irreplaceable as a special education
teacher at a youth development center school near Pittsburgh. His
local board denied his request for an occupational deferment and he
was ordered to report for induction. He refused to report and was
charged with willful refusal to submit to induction. The federal district court concluded that the denial of the occupational deferment
was without basis in fact.
As for conscientious objectors, the government assured the Supreme Court in Ehlert v. United States 12 that one whose beliefs, assertedly crystallized after mailing of an induction notice, will have
full opportunity to obtain an in-service determination of his claim without having to perform combatant training or service pending such
a disposition. It seems safe to say that the courts will hold the government to this assurance. In Crotty v. Kelly31 3 the First Circuit held,

"Applying Ehlert in conjunction with Gonzales, therefore, we conclude
that failure to afford petitioner access and a chance to respond to all
reports and recommendations concerning his conscientious objector
3' 14
claim was a denial of due process.
In Scott v. Commanding Officer3 15 the Third Circuit invalidated
an induction order because the registrant's file contained no statement
of the reasons for the Board's refusal to reopen his classification. The
registrant had claimed conscientious objector status after receiving
his induction order. After several delays he reported for induction
but filed a petition in the district court for a writ of habeas corpus.
The district court denied the writ. However, the Third Circuit
considered that, in the face of the Board's failure to state the reasons
for its action, it had no choice but to order the writ be issued.
I. Members of the Armed Forces
There is no area in which there are more discretionary orders
than in the armed forces. There are commands and chains of commands. Moreover, the courts rarely step in. As Justice Jackson explained in the Court's opinion in Orloff v. Willoughby :8
311. 341 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

312. 402 U.S. 99 (1971).
313. 443 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1971).

314. Id. at 217.

1

315. 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970).
For

other cases involving the Selective
L. REP. 3001 passim (1972).

SELECTIVE SERV.

Service

System, see 5 PLEI

Published
by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
316. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
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We know that from top to bottom of the Army the complaint is often made, and sometimes with justification, that there
is discrimination, favoritism or other objectionable handling of
men. But judges are not given the task of running the Army.
The responsibility for setting up channels through which such
grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the
Congress and upon the President of the United States and his
subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.
Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army
must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters. While
the courts have found occasion to determine whether one has
been lawfully inducted and is therefore within the jurisdiction
of the Army and subject to its orders, we have found no case
where this Court has assumed to revise duty orders as to one
lawfully in the service.3'7
In Orloff the Army refused a commission to a doctor because
he would not state whether he was, or had ever been, a member of
the Communist Party. The doctor asked the courts for habeas corpus
relief; the courts denied it.
An apt illustration of the extent of the military's exercise of
administrative discretion can be seen in the area of discharge. The
armed forces currently use five types of discharges: honorable, general
(under honorable conditions), undesirable (under conditions other than
honorable), bad conduct (under conditions other than honorable),
and dishonorable. While the latter two discharges can be given only
to enlisted personnel and only pursuant to a court-martial sentence,
an undesirable discharge, one which will brand the person for life,
can be given without notice or a hearing, without confrontation and
cross-examination. A former lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General's Corps has expressed the view that this discharge procedure
does not accord the individual "even the rudiments of due process of
law."818
Although the courts, as noted, are reluctant to interfere with
the exercise of military discretion, they will, as in the case of selective
service classification orders, give relief in certain situations. For example, in Harris v. Kaine,319 the district court granted relief to an
Army reservist who had been expelled from a reserve drill and denied
his pay for that meeting because he wore a short-hair wig to satisfy
the requirement that he present a neat and soldierly appearance.
317. Id. at 93-94.

318. Custis, Due Process and Military Discharges, 57 A.B.A.J. 875, 877 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
319. 352 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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The court based its decision on two grounds: first, that the regulation
which proscribed the wearing of a wig except by bald or disfigured
males, exceeded statutory authority; and second, that the right to
wear one's hair at any length or in any desired manner "is an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution."82 0
21
Another factually interesting wig case is Baugh v. Bennett
which involved a long-haired member of the Idaho Army National
Guard. When his long hair got him into trouble John Baugh started
wearing a short-length wig. His wig was discovered and he was
again in trouble. He then appeared before the General wearing a
short wig, and the General concluded that he had suffered a haircut.
He was thereupon advised that he was in conformance, that he was
reinstated in a Satisfactory Performance status, and that his past
absences were excused. Baugh promptly communicated the ruling to
his immediate superiors, but those doubting Thomases made inquiry
up the chain of command with the result that Baugh was involuntarily
called to active duty. The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted relief on the ground that Baugh "was denied
due process of law in that he was not afforded the meaningful appeal
to which he was entitled by Army regulations.

'8 22

In Felicianov. Laird3 23 the Second Circuit issued a writ of mandamus
to require the Army properly to reconsider, de novo, the application
for a hardship discharge of a draftee whose 17-year-old wife had given
birth prematurely and was in a state of severe, suicidal depression.
The writ was issued because the Army had failed to follow its own
regulations and forward the application to the Selective Service System.
In another hardship discharge case, Townley v. Resor,324 the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California
ordered that the discharge application be remanded to the Army.
The soldier involved had made a prima facie case for a hardship
discharge and the Army denied his application without stating its
reasons. The court, while noting that it could only reverse the Army
decision if it was arbitrary and capricious and thus violative of due
process, stated:
320. Id. at 775; accord, Friedman v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1972).
Contra, Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971); Comunale v. Mier, 355
F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Pa. 1973); McWhirter v. Froehlke, 351 F. Supp. 1098 (D.S.C.
1972) ; Cossey v. Seamans, 344 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
321. 329 F. Supp. 20 (D. Idaho 1971).
322. Id. at 24.
323. 426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Since a prima facie case has been made, it is incumbent on
the Army to state clearly its reasons for denying the application.
Without these reasons, meaningful judicial review is a nullity
and a measure of due process is summarily removed from the
5
system.

32

Students at military academies receive somewhat more in the way
of due process relief than other members of the military services, probably because their education and careers are at stake. Thus, in Hagopian
v. Knowlton, 26 Joachim Hagopian, a demerit-prone cadet facing expulsion and order to active duty because of five excess demerits, won a
court order preventing his expulsion from West Point. The district
court held that under the fifth amendment he was entitled to a fair
hearing, including notice of charges against him, adequate opportunity
to present defense, and right to legal counsel. The court observed that
almost half of the cadet's demerits for such infractions as wearing a
dirty uniform, failing to get a haircut, and using an unauthorized telephone, resulted from reports by the company tactical officer who was
the cadet's immediate superior. The same officer reported the infractions, awarded the demerits, and subsequently determined that the
demerits were correct. The court stated:
Such merger of prosecutorial and judicial function may be
entirely satisfactory for purposes of "correctional and educational
discipline" whereunder reasonable punishment is imposed to improve the efficiency or character of a cadet. It does not satisfy due
process or the simple needs of natural justice, where, as here, a
cadet will be also subject to a substantial forfeiture and irreparable damage, in the nature of expulsion.
There is nothing new to our jurisprudence in the theory that
no single person should be both prosecutor and judge in a cause. 27
The Second Circuit affirmed, stating:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting private interests may properly
be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid
formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any
given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which
depends upon the balancing of various factors, including the nature
of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to
which the proceeding is adversarial in character, the severity and
consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that
would be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply
of trial-type procedures, and the existence of other overriding in325. Id. at 568-69.

326. 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'g
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
327.

346 F. Supp. at 32.

346 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.).
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terests, such as the necessity for prompt action in the conduct of
crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be
considered in each case. It could hardly be contended, for instance, that disciplinary action on the field of battle must conform to procedures applicable to the demotion of a civilian em1 2 81
ployee on the home front.
The courts have also begun to give some relief where actions by
the armed forces have invaded constitutional rights of the people.
Morgan v. Rhodes, 29 a case arising out of the deaths of students on
Kent State University campus at the hands of the Ohio National
Guard, is an example. Certain students and others sought broad injunctive and declaratory relief against the Governor of Ohio and the
commanding officers of the Ohio National Guard. The district court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim
cognizable under federal law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that
one of the causes of action presented the question of whether there
was and is "a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio
National Guard which singly or together require or make inevitable
the use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders . . . .""
The
Sixth Circuit held that this cause of action was judicially cognizable.
The Second Circuit, in Cortright v. Resor,33 ' has gone in a different direction. That case involved the transfer of Army Band members in order to halt public expressions of disagreement with the Vietnam War. The district court granted relief but the Second Circuit
reversed. An appealing dissent concluded:
The majority would await a "stronger case" to intervene to
protect a serviceman's First Amendment rights. I suspect that
there were those who counselled waiting for a higher tax to
throw the tea into Boston Harbor, or suggested to Andrew
Hamilton that he wait for a client with a better case than John
328. 470 F.2d at 207; cf. Zitser v. Laird, 352 F. Supp. 438 (D. Conn. 1972);
Ballard v. Laird, 350 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1972). But cf.White v. Knowlton,
361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (United States Military Academy's procedure for
handling alleged honor code violations did not constitute a denial of due process).
In a suit brought by Dennis O'Neill, federal District Judge John R. Bartels
struck down as unconstitutional a regulation of the United States Merchant Marine
Academy that prohibited marriage by cadets. See Kaplan, Court Voids Ban on
Marriages by the Merchant Marine Academy, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 13, col. 1.
329. 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 409 U.S. 947 (1972). In Krause v.
Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, - U.S. -.- (1973), and
sub norn. Scheuer v. Rhodes, _ U.S. --- (1973), the court held that the governor,
the adjutant general, and other officers and enlisted men of the National Guard enjoyed immunity from suit for the actions of the National Guard on the Kent State
University campus.
330. 456 F.2d at 612.
331. 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972). Lovallo
v. Froehlke,
468 University
F.2d 340 Charles
(2d Cir.
1972),
involved
one ofRepository,
the band1973
members in
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Peter Zenger's to argue for free expression. I would, rather, agree
with Coke's aphorism: "No restraint be it never so little, but is
imprisonment, and foreign employment is a kind of honourable
banishment.

83 2
3

J. Bar Association Endorsements
Bar associations frequently rate candidates for judicial office. For
example, the Committee on the Judiciary of The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York rates candidates as "Approved as Highly
Qualified," "Approved" and "Not Approved." Are the individuals so
rated entitled as a matter of due process to notice and a hearing before
being rated?
In 1972 there were seven candidates for three judgeships on the
New York Court of Appeals, the State's highest court. One of the
seven, Family Court Judge Nanette Dembitz was rated "not qualified"
by The New York State Bar Association, the only one of the seven
so rated. However, Judge Dembitz was found qualified by The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York State Trial
Lawyers Association, a state Democratic party commission headed
by a former chief judge of the Court of Appeals, and a group of
Columbia University law professors. Judge Dembitz asked the State
Bar Association for a hearing. The New York Times editorialized:
"The State Bar Association cannot hide behind private rules of confidentiality once it has passed judgment in a public election. Judge
Dembitz has asked the State Bar Association for a hearing; it should
be granted.1

33 3

In the Republican sweep of that year Judge Dembitz, a Democrat,
as well as the other Democratic candidates lost to the three Republican candidates.
K. Discretion of Prosecutors
Although it may rarely be apparent, prosecutors exercise discretion as to whom to prosecute and for what offenses. In addition, there
is the so-called "Brooklyn Plan" under which the prosecutor, if he
deems it appropriate, may defer prosecution for a period of time, usually
one year. Over the course of the year, the defendant is under the supervision of a probation officer. Depending upon the conduct of the
defendant, the prosecution will usually dismiss the case at the end of
the year.
While it is hard to harness the discretion exercised by prosecutors,
the prosecutor can be brought to book in exceptional cases. For ex332. 447 F.2d at 259.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
333. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1972, at 46, cols. 1, 2.
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ample Jim Garrison, District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans,
was brought to book by Clay L. Shaw among others.
Despite the almost conclusive finding of the Warren Commission that Lee Harvey Oswald was President Kennedy's assassin,
Garrison had grandiose ideas about a new solution for the murder.
As a result of Garrison's ideas, Shaw was tried and acquitted on the
heinous charge that he conspired to assassinate President Kennedy.
Subsequent to Shaw's acquittal, Garrison immediately, and without
any witnesses other than those he used at the trial, charged Shaw with
perjury. Shaw went to the federal courts, charging that Garrison
had brought the perjury prosecution in bad faith, and obtained injunctive relief permanently barring Garrison from proceeding with
the perjury prosecution.3 4 Shaw received that relief despite the
s5
Younger v. Harris2
line of cases. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
The finding of a bad faith prosecution establishes irreparable injury both great and immediate for purposes of the comity restraints discussed in Younger. We conclude that Younger presents no bar to the issuance of an injunction33 6
Two newsmen, Walter Sheridan and Richard Townley, also
brought Garrison to book. As news reporters they covered Garrison's alleged investigation into the assassination and participated in
the broadcast of a television program critical of his conduct of the
investigation. Shortly thereafter, Garrison filed an information that
charged Sheridan with bribing a witness, and three informations
against Townley for bribing as well as intimidating witnesses. After
the filing, but before any trial or hearing on either case had begun,
Sheridan and Townley sought injunctive relief in the federal courts.
The federal district court denied relief but the Fifth Circuit reversed
33 7
and ordered an investigatory, evidentiary hearing.
3
8
In United States v. Steele,
the defendant successfully challenged his conviction for refusal to answer census questions on the
basis of discriminatory prosecution. Steele was one of only four
people in Hawaii who were chosen for prosecution. All four had
participated in a census resistance movement, publicizing a dissident
view of the census as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Steele
334. Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
335. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
336. 467 F.2d at 122.
337. Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), reV'g 273 F. Supp. 673
(E.D. La. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). For an able answer to the
critics of the work of the Warren Commission, see C. ROBERTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT
THE ASSASSINATION (1967).
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had held a press conference, led a protest march, and distributed
pamphlets entitled "Big Brother is Snooping." The Regional Technician for the census in Hawaii described the four as "hard core
resisters." The Ninth Circuit held that although mere selectivity in
prosecution creates no constitutional problems, discriminatory prosecution does. The court stated:
The principal [is established] that equal protection of the law
is denied when state officials enforce a valid statute in a discriminatory fashion. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment furnishes a federal defendant with the same guarantee
against discriminatory federal prosecution. .

.

.

A defendant

discrimination
cannot be convicted if he proves unconstitutional
3
in the administration of a penal statute.

11

Comparable situations can arise if the individual can show that
the prosecutor proceeded discriminatorily in some way, either against
blacks or long-haired youths or persons with unorthodox views. In
Littleton v. Berbling"4 ° some blacks and poor people filed a civil rights
complaint against two county judges and the state's attorney and his
investigator, charging that the judges imposed heavier fines and sentences and higher bail on blacks and the poor than on more affluent
whites, and that the state's attorney and his investigator denied to
blacks equal access to the criminal justice system. The district court
dismissed the complaint but the Seventh Circuit reversed holding that
the complaint stated a cause of action. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari and will probably render a decision during its 1973-1974
Term.
Another case involving impermissible selective prosecution is
United States v. Falk. 4 ' That case involved an active, vocal draft
counselor who alleged that his prosecution for failure to carry a draft
card was selective harassment designed to chill the exercise of his first
amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the

defendant's conviction and remanded the case to the district court,
holding that the defendant was entitled to have a hearing on his allegations of discriminatory selective prosecution at which the government
would have the burden of proving lack of improper motivation. The
court, after reviewing the law and facts and having reached its decision stated:
In conclusion, we wish to note our disapproval of the apparently
frequent, and often too easy, practice of simply dismissing all
339. Id. at 1151, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 1064 (1886).
340. 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom. Spoomer v. Littleton,
-U.S
_. (1973).
341. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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allegations of illegal discrimination in the enforcement of criminal laws with a reference to Oyler v. Boles, [368 U.S. 448
(1962)], and its statement that the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in the enforcement of laws does not violate the Constitution. That correct principle does not in many cases answer
the question whether selective enforcement in a given case is
invidious discrimination which
cannot be reconciled with the
34 2

principles of equal protection.

Although the preceding cases may indicate to the contrary, such
charges will usually not prevail. Linda R. S. v. Richard D."43 is
illustrative. Texas has a statute which provides that any parent who
wilfully refuses to provide for the support of a child under 18 years
of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. Linda R. S., the mother of an
illegitimate child, went to the local district attorney and asked him
to proceed against the father of the child. The district attorney refused to take action for the express reason that in his view the fathers
of illegitimate children were not within the scope of this act. She
then filed suit in the federal district court on behalf of herself, her
child, and others similarly situated, to enjoin such discriminatory
application of the Texas statute. A three-judge court was convened,
but dismissed the action for want of standing. The Supreme Court
affirmed. Justice White, in an opinion in which Justice Douglas
joined, argued to the contrary:
Unquestionably, Texas prosecutes fathers of legitimate children on the complaint of the mother asserting nonsupport and
refuses to entertain like complaints from a mother of an illegitimate child. I see no basis for saying that the latter mother has
no standing to demand
that the discrimination be ended, one
44
way or the other.3

United States v. Bland 4 ' furnishes another recent example. After
the Supreme Court held, in Kent v. United States,

46

a case involving

a provision of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, that juveniles have due process rights, the Congress sought to circumvent
the Court's ruling by excluding from the definition of "child" those
16- and 17-year-olds the United States attorney charged with certain
offenses. Congress thus sought to give the United States attorney the
discretion to treat these persons either as juveniles or as adults. In
342. Id. at 624.
343. 411 U.S. 614 (1973).
344. Id. at 621.

345. 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); accord,
Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
346. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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Bland the District of Columbia Circuit sustained the provision with
the comment that its ruling was in accord with "the long and widely
accepted concept of prosecutorial discretion which derives from the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 3 47 The Supreme
Court denied review. However, Justice Douglas, in a dissent in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, pointed out:
The Administrative Procedure Act gives the courts power
to review "agency action" and to hold it unlawful, if found to be
"contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity."
This arguably is broad enough to reach the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion in a way that violates the standards of due
process laid down in Kent and in Gault. 8
L.

Sentencing

Although a judge usually does the sentencing, it is in essence an
administrative act. Moreover, some sentencing is done by administrative officials. For instance, in New York, with Class E felonies
(where the maximum sentence is four years), if the judge imposes an
indeterminate sentence (which has to be at least three years) the
state Board of Parole fixes the minimum period of imprisonment.3 49
California has a comparable provision."' 0
Today sentencing is usually based on a presentence report. Thus,
the report affects a person's liberty and, as a matter of due process,
should be available to the defendant or his counsel.
For years the writer has been asking for the presentence reports
on his clients as a matter of due process. In the Federal District
Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, until
347. 472 F.2d at 1335.
348. 412 U.S. at 912 (citations omitted).
For other instances where allegations of discriminatory prosecution did not
prevail, see, e.g., United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972) ("Mere
failure to prosecute others similarly situated does not constitute a violation of due
process or equal protection." Id. at 927) ; United States v. Malinowski, 347 F. Supp.
347 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("It is not all selective enforcement that is forbidden but that
which is based on some unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary
classification." Id. at 353); United States v. Fletcher, 344 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va.
1972) ("The contention defendant has been denied equal protection under the law
because other members of the Armed Forces at Langley who are taken into custody
for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants are carried
before their Commanding Officer rather than charged under the statute and carried
before the Magistrate is without merit." Id. at 338); United States v. Goldstein,
342 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. N.Y. 1972) ("there is no denial of equal protection of the
laws in the selection by IRS or any other government prosecutor, of particular cases
for prosecution - at least in the absence of invidious class discrimination." Id. at 668).
In Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973), the court invalidated a Florida procedure under which a state attorney could file an information
and avoid the requirement of the determination of probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate as violative of the fourth amendment as well as the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
349. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1967).
350. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3020 (West 1970).
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recently, he never received them. In other federal district courts,
he invariably did.
As late as June 1972, in United States v. Brown,8 5 in response
to defense counsel's request for the disclosure of the presentence report, District Judge Walter Bruchhausen of the Eastern District of
New York declared, "Well it is not the policy of the Court to disclose pre-sentence reports . ..It has never been done in all my time

in the courtroom that I can recall. 3' 5 2 The Second Circuit, in reversing Judge Bruchhausen and remanding the case for reconsideration and resentencing by another judge, had this footnote to Judge
Bruchhausen's statement:
Appellant argues that the judge mistakenly believed there was
a uniform policy of non-disclosure in the Eastern District of
New York. We construe the judge's remarks as referring only
to his own policy. If there were such a uniform district practice -

and we have no reason to believe that there is -

it would

be an even more egregious violation of the spirit of the Rule.8 53
However, the writer can corroborate Judge Bruchhausen's statement: as noted, until recently the judges in the Eastern and Southern
Districts of New York never disclosed to him the presentence reports
on his clients.
Indeed, until 1966 the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contained no provision for the disclosure of the presentence report. A
1966 amendment to rule 32(c) (2) provides:
The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity
to the defendant or his counsel to comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel
shall also be dis354
closed to the attorney for the government.

One will note that the matter of disclosure is still within the discretion
of the trial judge. The amendment provides that the judge before
imposing sentence "may disclose," not that he must.
Parole boards, in the instances where they impose minimum sentences, display even less inclination than trial judges to disclose the
reasons or bases for their determinations. Let us take the case of one
of the writer's clients, Otis Massey, to whom the trial judge in New
York gave an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of four years.
351.
352.
353.
354.

470 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972).
As quoted in id. at 287 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 288 n.4.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1970).
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Under date of August 2, 1972, the writer sent a letter to Paul J. Regan,
Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, advising him that
he represented Mr. and Mrs. Otis Massey and offering on their behalf:
I would like to meet with the Parole Board in Albany and
have with me Mrs. Massey as well as two of their eight children
who are over the age of 14 - Harold who is 17 and Gail who is
16. At that time I would like to present to the Board additional
information as well as certain letters on behalf of Mr. Massey

which I think will have a significant bearing on his parole. I
feel that a review of the situation and a consideration of the additional material that I plan to call to the Board's attention will
be encouraging for Mr. Massey and for his family."'
Under date of September 13, 1972, Mr. Regan replied, a letter the
writer quotes in full except for the salutation and the closing:
I regretfully have been delayed in replying to your letters of
August 2, August 16 and September 6, in behalf of Mr. Massey.
According to the records, Otis Massey was convicted and sentenced by the Honorable David 0. Boehm to two concurrent
terms of four years for promoting gambling in the first degree
and possession of gambling records in the first degree. Since
the Court did not impose a minimum but only a maximum sentence, it is the responsibility of the Board of Parole to determine
a minimum period of imprisonment. This the Board did in
August, 1972, holding Mr. Massey one year and four months,
allowing for time already confined and, thus, setting his hearing for possible parole in January of 1973. This appearance is
in accord with legal requirements and the question of release on
parole is [sic] not taken up by the Board at his hearing in
August, 1972.
Mr. Massey's record in the institution was available to the Board,
as well as information concerning his offense and background
and a personal interview was conducted with him by the Parole
Board. Following this, the Board's decision was determined
after a careful evaluation of all factors in the case.
I do not feel it is necessary for Mrs. Massey and her children
to travel to Albany, New York, inasmuch as information relating
to the personal and family history was already a part of the case
record and available to the Board members at the minimum
period of imprisonment hearing. However, if you feel that Mr.
Massey or his immediate family have any additional information, they can forward this to my attention and I would be only
too glad to carefully review all the facts in his case. It should
be understood that this is not a guarantee that favorable action
will be taken by the Board.
355. Letter from 0. John Rogge to Paul J. Regan,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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The letters from Reverend Young, Mr. Willie C. Brown and
the employment offer from Mr. Ephraim J. Kauffman, will be
placed in Mr. Massey's record so that they will be available to
the members of the Board of Parole before whom he will appear
at the time of parole consideration." 6
The Board of Parole wanted no further help from the prisoner's
counsel, either for fixing the minimum period of imprisonment or
for release on parole.
However, in the courts there has been a change for the better.,
United States v. BroZVn, 35 7 referred to previously, provides an illus-

tration. That case concerned the sentencing of a young black teacher
and writer who refused to fight in the Vietnam War. Remanding the
case to a different judge for reconsideration and resentencing, the Second Circuit stated:
When the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended
in 1966 to provide . ..that the sentencing court "may disclose"

the pre-sentence report, it certainly was intended that the sentencing court exercise its discretion in each case. It is equally
clear that when a judge states, as he did here, that in effect
his policy is never to disclose pre-sentence reports, that is not
an exercise of discretion on an individual basis. .

.

. Moreover,

we have pointed out that the preferable practice, absent circumstances calling for confidentially, is to disclose to the defendant or
his counsel at least the substance of the pre-sentence report 58:
Other federal cases illustrate the recent trend. In United States
59
v. Janiec,3
a case in which the trial court had denied the defendant's
motion for disclosure of presentence reports, the Third Circuit concluded:
[T]he list of prior convictions, contained in the presentence report, must be disclosed, when requested by the defendant or his
counsel unless the district court does not rely in any way upon a
defendant's prior convictions. We believe that this conclusion is
60
3
constitutionally required.

A few years earlier the Fourth Circuit, in Baker v. United States,3 6
while acknowledging the permissive nature of rule 32(c) (2), nevertheless reached the same result, saying:
Admittedly there are items in the report of which the de-!
fendent is rightfully entitled to be advised. The sentencing court
356. Letter from Paul J. Regan to 0. John Rogge, Sept. 13, 1972.
357. 470 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 351 supra.
358. Id. at 285, 287-88.
359. 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1972).
360. Id. at 127.
361. 388
F.2d 931University
(4th Cir.
1968).Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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should apprise him, orally from the bench, of at least such pivotal
matters of public record as the convictions and charges of crime,
with date and place, attributed to him in the report. As this may
be done without handing the defendant or counsel the report,
the procedure could not lead to62a destruction of the probation
officer's sources of information.

However, even those courts which require at least partial disclosure of the presentence report make an exception for the ubiquitous
confidential informant. The Fourth Circuit in Baker went so far as to
say that the disclosure of the presentence report with its consequent
revelation of confidential informants could defeat the object of the
report .33

The concept that a confidential informant must be protected is
widespread; the writer has always challenged it. If one person has
made a statement about another upon which that other's life, liberty,
or property depends at least in part, then the person making the statement should be subject to taking the witness stand for examination
and cross-examination. If such a requirement were adopted there
would be less talebearing.
Originally, the drafters of the 1966 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure made disclosure of the presentence report mandatory. The Advisory Committee's note explains why it
reversed itself:
Substantial objections to compelling disclosure in every case
have been advanced by federal judges, including many who in
practice often disclose all or parts of presentence reports. Hence,
the amendment goes no further than to make it clear that courts
may disclose all or part of the presentence report to the defendant
or to his counsel. It is hoped that courts will make increasing
use of their discretion to disclose so that defendants generally
may be given full opportunity to rebut or explain facts in presentence reports which will be material factors in determining
sentences.3 6
However, in its 1970 proposals, the Advisory Committee abandoned its unsuccessful experiment with discretionary disclosure and
moved forward to a position favoring mandatory disclosure, with an
exception, of course, for the confidential informant.86 5 The Advisory Committee's note to the proposed amendment states:
362. Id. at 933.

363. Id.

364. Quoted in 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 32.03[4] (2d ed. 1973) (citation omitted).
365. The proposed rut.; is set forth in id. at 32-39 to 32-40, n.32.21.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/1
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In recent years, three prestigious organizations have recommended that the report be disclosed to the defense. See American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 4.4 (Approved Draft, 1968); American
Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 7.07(5) (P.O.D. 1962);
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing
Act § 4 (1963). This is also the recommendation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) ..
"'
The courts of other jurisdictions have been more generous
than the federal courts in making presentence reports available to
the defendant or his counsel. In England,86 7 California,16 8 and New

Jersey, 8 9 when a conviction has been for a serious crime, the report
must be fully disclosed and counsel must be given an opportunity to
rebut its contents. In Virginia the report must be presented in open
court with the defendant being apprised of its content and having a
right to cross-examine the one who prepared it. 7 0° In Connecticut the

defendant is furnished the report but the court's discretion determines
the limits of the defense's rights to interrogate the investigator who
prepared it. 17 ' In Minnesota,' 72 Maryland,8 73 and North Carolina,8

74

366. Quoted in id. at 32-40 n.32.21.
For other recent federal cases on the disclosure issue, see United States
v. Schrenzel, 462 F.2d 765 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984 (1972) (disclosure
of the presentence report within the discretion of the trial judge) ; United States v.
Stidham, 459 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1972) ("We have held that it is not a violation
of due process to deny a defendant's request to see the presentence report." Id. at
299) ; United States v. McKinney, 450 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Knupp, 448 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1971), and United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178
(DC. Cir. 1971) (disclosure of the presentence report is within the discretionary
authority of the trial judge). In Dockery, Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote a
forceful dissent which concluded:
The time has come, indeed it is long past, to recognize that "guilty" individuals deserve fundamentally fair treatment, just as do those we presume
innocent. We must forcefully and finally reject "the ancient view that a convicted
defendant becomes an outlaw, a person with no legal rights whose property
and even identity may be forfeit." So too must we reject the more modern
paternalistic assumption that the "guilty" are mere social problems to be solved
rather than individuals to be treated fairly. The trend of law and opinion, I
believe, is to recognize and protect the rights of criminal convicts, whether
in the procedures by which they are sent to and released from prison or in the
conditions which they must endure while incarcerated, A guarantee of fairness
and accuracy at the sentencing hearing is a good place to begin.
447 F.2d at 1200-01.
367. Criminal Justice Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 43.
368. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1970).

369. See New Jersey v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 144-45, 259 A.2d 895, 903-04 (1969).
370. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (1972).
371. See Connecticut v. Harmon, 147 Conn. 125, 129, 157 A.2d 594, 596 (1960).
372. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.115(4) (1964).
373. See MD. RULES OF PROc., Rule 761 (c) and Driver v. Maryland, 201 Md. 25,
32, 92 A.2d 570, 573-74 (1952).
374. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-207 (1965) and North Carolina v. Pope, 257 N.C.
326, 334-35,
126 S.E.2d
126, Charles
132-33 Widger
(1962). School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
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the substance of the report must be disclosed, although provision is
made to safeguard from disclosure the sources of information it
contains.
Recently the highest courts of two jurisdictions, Arizona and
Pennsylvania adopted section 4.4 of the American Bar Association's
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures and
thus added their voices to those calling for the disclosure of the presentence report. 75 Section 4.4(a) provides:
Fundamental fairness to the defendant requires that the substance of all derogatory information which adversely affects his
interests and which has not otherwise been disclosed in open
court should be called to the attention of the defendant,
his attor3 76
ney, and others who are acting on his behalf.
Some day, hopefully, there will be a due process right to the disclosure
of a presentence report to the defendant and his counsel.
375. State v. Pierce, 108 Ariz. 174, 494 P.2d 696 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Phelps, 450 Pa. 597, 301 A.2d 678 (1973).
376. ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND

PROCEDURES

§ 4.4(a) (Approved Draft 1968) (emphasis added).
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I.

Recent cases involving teachers.

Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973) (state university's refusal
to renew nontenured teacher's contract because it considered her teaching philosophy
to be incompatible with its pedagogical aims held not violative of first amendment
rights) petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1973) (No. 73-470) ;
Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 476 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1973) (allegation of racial discrimination in school board's refusal to rehire held to entitle
teachers to full evidential hearing in the district court) ; Clark v. Holmes, 474
F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973) ("we do not conceive
academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with
established curricular contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning
of the institution" id. at 931) ; Stolberg v. Members of the Bd. of Trustees, 474
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (faculty member discharged for exercise of first amendment rights entitled to reinstatement with tenure without loss of seniority and
damages for intervening salary loss plus reasonable attorney's fees); Calvin v.
Rupp, 471 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1973) (teacher whose notice of reemployment was
revoked was accorded due process); Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988
(2d Cir. 1973), Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973), and Patrone v. Howland Local Schools Bd., 472 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1972) (nontenured teachers accorded due process) ; George v. Conneaut Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 132 (6th Cir.
1972) (summary judgment not proper in case of nontenured teacher when the
record presented a genuine question as to whether the board's failure to renew his
contract was due to his exercise of first amendment rights); Johnson v. Fraley,
470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (teacher, nontenured but continuously employed for
29 years, entitled to notice and a hearing); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469
F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (violation of first amendment rights to dismiss probationary teacher for standing silently at attention during
daily classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance) ; Lewis v. Spencer, 468
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (wife half of a husband and wife teaching team entitled
to a hearing on claim that action against her was in retaliation for her exercise
of first amendment rights) ; Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972)
(nontenured teachers entitled to a hearing on claim that the nonrenewal of their
contracts was in retaliation for conduct protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments) ; Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
U.S. __ (1973)
(state administrative remedy to be first exhausted); Rozman
v. Elliott, 467 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1972) (nontenured associate professor's action
in occupation of R.O.T.C. building, contribution to cancellation of a class, and
defiance of university president's order held valid grounds for dismissal, outside
the protection of the first amendment); Lukac v. Acocks, 466 F.2d 577 (6th Cir.
1972) (nontenured football coach not entitled to know the reason for nonrenewal
nor to a hearing); Cook County College Teachers v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S, 848 (1972)
(plaintiffs' burden of proving that nonretention of probationary college teachers resulted from antiunion bias not sustained) ;
Cooley v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972) (summary midterm dismissal held to deprive teacher of procedural due process) ; Cornist v. Richland
Parish School Bd., 448 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1971) (summarily dismissed tenured
public school teacher held entitled to relief under the Civil Rights Act) ; Mailloux
v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (statement in Code of Ethics of Education
Profession held impermissibly vague and not sufficient to justify a post facto decision
that use of a particular teaching method was grounds for dismissal) ; Orr v.
Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972) (nontenured public school teacher not entitled to statement of reasons for school board's
refusal to renew his contract nor to a hearing); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945
(5th Cir. 1970) (teacher with expectancy of reemployment held entitled to a statement of reasons for termination and, if reasons for termination involved a possible
collision with first amendment rights, a hearing).
Francis v. Ota, 356 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Hawaii 1973) (failure to follow established procedures for granting tenure violated due process); Doherty v. Wilson,
356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (school board's refusal to employ teacher
because of her residence on a communal farm violated constitutionally protected
right of free association) ; Haiduk v. Vocational Tech. & Adult Educ. Dist., 356
F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (on a motion to dismiss, allegation that the actual
reason for nonretention of a nontenured public school teacher was the teacher's
criticism of the board of education held to state a valid cause of action); Burton
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v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973) (Oregon statute that
permitted local school boards to dismiss teachers for "immorality" held unconstitutionally vague); Bhargave v. Cloer, 355 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (probationary teacher entitled to a due process hearing prior to the termination of
her contract in the middle of a school year); Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp.
900 (D. Ariz. 1972) (summary judgment for teacher because the court concluded
that the primary reason for action taken against him was grounded in his exercise
of first amendment rights in expressing unpopular views); Olson v. Trustees of
Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (failure to promote an assistant professor to full professor held to violate no constitutionally protected right) ;
United States v. Nansemond County School Bd., 351 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va.
1972) in the absence of showing any connection between the desegregation of the
school system and dismissals of teachers, the dismissed teachers' proof that the
system had been recently desegregated and that they were discharged did not shift
the burden to the school board to justify its action) ; Shumate v. Board of Educ.,
350 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. W. Va. 1972) (failure to reemploy probationary high
school teacher held not actionable) ; Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Cent. Com. School
Dist,, 349 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (nonrenewal of Iowa teacher's contract on ground of professional incompetence as indicated by low scholastic accomplishments of students on specified tests held arbitrary and capricious) ; Kennedy
v. Engel, 348 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (assistant professor at United States
Merchant Marine Academy held to have no legitimate claim to tenure and no
basis for a claim of entitlement to tenure which would entitle him to a due process
hearing by the Tenure Committee) ; Gassin v. Haskey, 348 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Mo. 1972) (public school teacher without tenure or a reasonable expectation of
reemployment held to have no right to a hearing on her objections to reassignment when the evidence showed her allegations of impermissible racial motivation
to be unfounded) ; Lawrence v. Barker, 347 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Tex. 1972)
(procedure followed by school district accorded nontenured teacher due process
and teacher's prayer for relief was denied); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ.,
346 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (school board enjoined from dismissal of
any teacher when such dismissal would reduce the racial balance in the faculty
and infringe on fourteenth amendment rights); Appler v. Mountain Pine School
Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1131 (W.D. Ark. 1972) (failure to accord hearing required
by an Arkansas act violative of due process) ; Boyce v. Alexis I. duPont School
Dist., 341 F. Supp. 678 (D. Del. 1972) (nontenured teacher accorded due process on the facts, held that the failure to reemploy teacher violated neither fourteenth
amendment due process nor first amendment freedom of speech) ; Schreiber v. Joint
School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (teacher dismissed during the
course of her one-year employment held entitled to a statement of the reasons
and a hearing) ; Cochran v. Odell, 334 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (probationary
teacher not entitled to pretermination hearing) ; Bates v. Hinds, 334 F. Supp.
528 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (nontenured teacher threatened with termination during his
contractual term held to have the same right to hearing as a tenured teacher
threatened with nonrenewal of his contract) ; Shields v. Watrel, 333 F. Supp.
260 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (nontenured teacher not entitled to pretermination hearing);
Jinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ga. 1971), modified on other grounds,
464 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1972) (policy of board of education in denying maternity
leave to nontenured teachers while granting it to tenured teachers constituted a
violation of equal protection) ; Auerbach v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 330
F. Supp. 808 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (professor not accorded tenure entitled to statement of reasons and a hearing); Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist.,
330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1971) (nontenured teacher protected from arbitrary,
discriminating, or capricious nonrenewal).
In Acanfora v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md.
1973), the court expressed the view that a school board's policy of refusing to
hire homosexuals as teachers infringed upon their constitutionally protected right
to engage in private, consensual, adult homosexuality.
In Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C.
1973), the court, in giving relief to a student teacher who was dismissed for
having responded to students' questions with answers approving Darwinian theory,
indicating personal agnosticism, and questioning the literal interpretation of the
Bible, wrote: "To discharge a teacher without warning because his answers to
scientific and theological questions do not fit the notion of the local parents and
teachers is a violation of the Establishment clause of the First Amendment."
Id. at 1043.
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In Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, --- P.2d _-, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1973), the court sustained the validity of a California statute providing for the automatic suspension of the credentials of any teacher who had
been convicted of a sex offense.
In Webb v. Lake Mills Corm. School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972)
the court held that a high school drama coach, who had been dismissed after
staging a play which contained the words "damn" and "son of a bitch" even
though they were watered down to "darn" and "son of a biscuit" for public performances, was entitled to reinstatement and back pay. Granting that relief, the
Court noted:
With respect to the academic freedom of teachers of high school students
of the age of those involved in the instant case, federal courts dealing with
the subject have upheld two kinds of academic freedom: the substantive right
of a teacher to choose a teaching method which in the court's view served
a demonstrated educational purpose; and the procedural right of a teacher not
to be discharged for the use of a teaching method which was not proscribed
by a regulation, and as to which it was not shown that the teacher should
have had notice that its use was prohibited.
Id. at 799.
II.

Recent cases involving public employees.

Stradley v. Anderson, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973) (police department hair
length regulation held constitutional) ; Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir.
1973) (city home rule charter provision prohibiting "continuing in the classified
service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any
public office" invalidated on the grounds that the right to run for public office
is based upon freedom of individual expression and freedom of association); Wood
v. United States Post Office Dep't, 472 F.2d 96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973) (reversing lower court order of reinstatement on the grounds that
the lower court erred in requiring that the dismissal be supported by substantial
evidence since a court should order reinstatement of a government employee only
if the discharge is not supportable on any rational basis) ; Cole v. Choctow County
Bd. of Educ., 471 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973) (discharge
of black school bus driver because she discussed racial segregation with the F.B.I.
and actively supported a school boycott held constitutionally impermissible); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973)
(affirming lower court's judgment in favor of a chaplain at a state mental hospital
who had been discharged on the grounds that society's interest in "uninhibited and
robust debate" on such matters of public concern as mental health care, combined
with the individual's freedom of speech, outweighed the interests of the state as
employer) ; Diles v. Woolsey, 468 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1972) (workmen's compensation referee who had served in that position for 15 years held not entitled to a
statement of reasons or a hearing upon dismissal since his status was that of a
nontenured state employee); Harnett v. Ulett, 466 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1972)
(probationary social worker at state hospital not entitled to pretermination hearing) ;
Fisher v. Walker, 464 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1972) (fireman's suspension for five
days did not violate his first amendment rights); Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d
871 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 981 (1973) (interim injunctive relief
granted probationary employee who charged that agency did not follow its own
regulations) ; McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, (5th Cir. 1971) (discharge of
school superintendent not violative of either substantive or procedural due process);
Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966) (doctor discharged from job
as part-time attending physician at a municipal hospital because of an alleged antiblack bias entitled to pretermination notice and hearing).
Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp.
500 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discharge of nurse infringed rights guaranteed her under
the first amendment since she was fired solely because of her published statements
in the Philadelphia Daily News); Sayah v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1008
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (probationary employee of a federal agency has no property
interest in continued employment); Abbott v. Thetford, 354 F. Supp. 1280 (M.D.
Ala. 1973) (chief probation officer who brought suit as next friend for certain
minors in violation of a departmental order was properly discharged) ; Bean v.
Darr, 354 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (dismissal of a sanitation employee did
not violate first amendment because employee's "vociferous expression" of ideas
was aimed at the disruption of harmony and insubordination to his superiors
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and was, therefore, not constitutionally protected speech); Heaphy v. United States
Treasury Dep't, 364 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (federal probationary employee
held properly discharged); Monti v. Flaherty, 351 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
(dismissal of city policeman for failure to comply with residence requirement but
without affording him a hearing violated due process); Jones v. Kelly, 347 F.
Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1972) (court-appointed children's supervisor in city Juvenile
Detention Home had no right to pretermination hearing) ("Public employees serving, as in the instant case, at the will and pleasure of a municipality or an officer
thereof, are subject to summary discharge with or without cause, so long as such
discharge is not in retribution for an exercise of some constitutionally protected
right." Id. at 1263); Martin v. Conlisk, 347 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (certificate of appointment as a special policeman could not be revoked without notice
and a hearing); Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972) (Civil
Service Commission may, "consonant with the First Amendment," refuse to consider an application until the applicant furnishes information relating to his homosexuality as required by established Commission policy) ; Harrington v. Taft, 339 F.
Supp. 670 (D.R.I. 1972) (probationary police officer entitled to a written, detailed
statement of the reasons for his dismissal and to access to all administrative reports in which his performance as a policeman was evaluated) ; Hunter v. City
of Ann Arbor, 325 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (assistant director of city's
Department of Human Rights entitled to a hearing prior to discharge despite contention that power of summary dismissal was required to maintain relationship
of trust between department heads and their immediate subordinates) ; Newcomer
v. Coleman, 323 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Conn. 1970) (public housing director could
not be discharged without notice of the charges and a full and fair hearing);
Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1971) (public employee serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority may
be dismissed at will); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88 Nev. Adv. Op. 55, 495
P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972) (governing body of public hospital,
after notice and hearing, properly terminated doctor's medical staff privileges for
unprofessional conduct).
The Ninth Circuit ruled, in Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1973),
that a revenue agent's dismissal for refusing to furnish records for a personal
tax audit without a prior determination of his claim that the audit was an unreasonable search constituted a violation of his constitutional rights.
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973), the Court held that section
53 of the New York Civil Service Law, which restricted permanent positions
in the competitive class of the state civil service to United States citizens, violated
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Swinney v. Untreiner, 272 So.2d 805 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 3064 (1973), sustained the validity of a Florida statute
which curtailed political activities of a person holding an office or place in the
classified service on penalty of dismissal.
In Illinois State Employees v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), the Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal of a
non-civil service state employee for failure to support the partisan political views
of his immediate superior violated the first amendment. The court wrote, "It is
now axiomatic 'that the state and federal governments . . . do not constitutionally
have the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer.'" Id. at 575.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Sanford v. Rockefeller, 32 N.Y.2d 788,
337 N.Y.S.2d 688, 298 N.E.2d 681 (1973), appeal filed sub nor. Collins v. Rockefeller, 42 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. July 26, 1973), decided that the procedures set
forth in section 210 of the New York Civil Service Law, often referred to as the
Taylor Act, seeking to outlaw strikes by public employees, constituted sufficient
due process.
III.

Recent cases involving students.

Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) (school board regulation
that required principal's review and approval of student publications but provided
neither a time limit within which the principal must act nor a method of review
of his decision constituted an unreasonable restriction of the first amendment rights
of students); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (predominantly
black state university president's withdrawal of financial support from official student
newspaper, which had a segregationist editorial policy, abridged freedom of the
press in violation of the first amendment); Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171 (9th
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Cir. 1973) (5-day suspension of a high school student because of his role in the
distribution of protest signs invalidated due to the protected nature of the activity
and the school's failure to meet its burden of justification); Bazaar v. Fortune,
476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973) (University of Mississippi ordered not to interfere
with the publication and distribution of Images, a student publication which employed four-letter words); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 475 F.2d
1071 (5th Cir. 1973) (procedures under which high school student was suspended
prior to a hearing held to have accorded him due process) ; Black Students v.
Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972) (public school student may not be suspended for 10 days without a prior hearing) ; Pervis v. LaMarque Independent School
Dist., 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972) (in a suspension case, subsequent hearing does
not cure the initial deprivation of due process) ; Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d
629 (7th Cir. 1972) (high school student who admitted the misconduct with which
she was charged - setting false fire alarms - held to have been accorded due
process; the admission rendered a hearing prior to her transfer not essential);
Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973)
(high school principal's suspension of student wearing Confederate flag
emblem in school previously disrupted by racial polarization sustained); Linwood
v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972) (Illinois procedure for suspension
and expulsion of students held to meet due process requirement) ; Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972) (submission of charges against
university students to a special disciplinary panel did not deprive the students
of due process nor were the regulations under which they were charged and disciplined unconstitutionally vague and overbroad) ; Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1972) (suspension of student held valid - his allegation that the
decision maker, the associate dean of students, was biased was unfounded) ; Williams
v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971) (superintendent's 30day suspension of a student without benefit of a hearing violated due process).
Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973) (defendants enjoined
from enforcing regulation prohibiting the distribution of nonschool sponsored written
materials on school grounds, and suspensions for the distribution of such materials
on school grounds voided); Boyd v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ind. 1973)
(suspended student must first exhaust administrative remedies) ; Fielder v. Board
of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972) ("due process in student expulsion
cases, wherein there is no clear urgency for acting prior to a hearing, demands
at least (1) a notice of the reasons advanced for the proposed expulsion, and (2)
a hearing (a) held sufficiently after the giving of the notice to enable the student
to prepare to respond to the reasons given, (b) at which the factual bases for
those reasons can be refuted, if the student is able to refute them, and (c) at
which cross-examination can be conducted of the person or persons primarily aware
of the reasons being leveled for the proposed expulsion. Id. at 730) ; Dejesus v.
Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972) (expulsion based on hearsay constituted a denial of due process).
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